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Abstract 
This thesis analyses possible determinants explaining restructuring outcomes for financially 
distressed firms in the Norwegian bond market. This includes both Norwegian firms and 
foreign firms issuing bonds in the Norwegian market, restricted to bonds issued or matured 
in the seven year period between January 1st 2005 and December 31st 2011.  
Our findings indicate that firms resolving financial distress only by postponing obligations 
have better financial performance, are larger measured in total assets and sales, and have 
significantly lower interest expenses to sales than all other firms involved in a credit event. 
Further, liquidated firms are financed by significantly more public debt, and more of their 
debt is senior secured than firms succeeding to restructure. They also have significantly less 
intangible assets than debt restructuring firms. Fewer of the liquidated firms have access to 
bank financing, but given that a firm has access to such financing we found no substantial 
difference either in levels or the importance of determinants compared to firms without bank 
debt. Somewhat surprisingly, firms restructuring by selling assets have significantly more 
convertible debt. 
As opposed to previous research on U.S. firms, we find no significant effect of the level of 
trade credit, current ratios or leverage measured by debt level. This may be due to a limited 
sample size.  
 
 
 
Several people have contributed with helpful input in the process of writing this thesis; most 
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in early stages of the process, and Torgeir Stensaker at Nordea for conversations updating 
and improving our overview of the Norwegian bond market. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to reveal the determinants explaining restructuring outcome for 
financially distressed firms in the Norwegian bond market. Our focus is on the resolution of 
distress for the firm as a whole, and not returns for the individual stakeholders. We have 
chosen not to take either the corporate or investor side for two reasons. First, a recent thesis 
by Brekke and Haugland (2010) covered the investor perspective of the Norwegian bond 
market by studying recovery rates in the high yield market. Second, a better understanding of 
the restructuring process and its key determinants benefits all involved parties, from 
management to investors and trustees, and enables them to make more informed decisions.  
The past decade the Norwegian bond market has grown at a tremendous pace, and bonds 
have become an important part of the capital structure for a growing number of Norwegian 
firms. This development of the debt market has expanded the investment universe for 
investors and firms, and projects have gained more efficient access to capital. This implies 
that riskier firms and projects, that banks previously would not lend money to, will be able to 
issue debt directly in the market.  
Additionally, stricter regulations of banks by the new Basel requirements will reduce their 
ability to participate as creditors in risky firms. It will also increase the cost of bank 
financing, encouraging more firms to issue bonds instead. This is expected to increase the 
popularity and importance of bond financing further in the years to come.  
Unfortunately, a broader access to capital does not come without caveats. As a direct 
consequence of allocating more debt to riskier firms we observe an increasing number of 
defaults. And with the forecasts of increasing popularity for public financing, the frequency 
of observing firms struggling to meet their obligations is likely to increase further. Having 
this in mind, a better understanding of the debt renegotiation process will be helpful both to 
investors and firm management. By knowing what the typical obstacles to a solution are, or 
who the dominant players dictating the outcome under different scenarios are, it would be 
easier to avoid making suboptimal decisions when they find themselves involved in a 
distressed situation.  
Firms that default on interest payments or debt installments may still have viable business 
plans and prospects to become profitable. To liquidate these firms would be inefficient. 
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Hence, these firms would have to undertake a restructuring to endure, which leads us to the 
core objective of this thesis. Given a default, we want to find what makes a firm worth 
restructuring and what determines the methods used for restructuring. By default we do not 
restrict ourselves to actual defaults, but also cases where a default would be inevitable 
without action. Our criteria for selecting credit events are based on the FAS15 definition of 
troubled debt restructurings by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
We have divided the credit events into categories that we believe will have significant 
differences in financial data explaining the restructuring outcome. These categories are 
liquidation, asset restructuring and financial restructuring. The latter, we have divided into 
two subcategories: changes in capital structure and postponement of obligations, within 
which postponement is the least severe of all categories. It is important to note that since 
several comprehensive restructurings are often preceded by attempts to postpone obligations, 
like extending maturity, our most recent cases may not be completely resolved yet. This 
could bias our restructuring categories and results, but a closer examination of these cases 
indicates no alarming tendency of this.  
Similar research on U.S. firms has typically categorized firms based on whether they file for 
Chapter 11 or not. Even though Norwegian bankruptcy legislation provides a similar option 
to distressed firms, larger firms rarely use it. Thus, using a similar legislative categorization 
is not feasible to analyze the Norwegian bond market at the moment.   
Early on, practitioners warned us that gathering data for a thesis like this would be 
challenging, which is the primary reason why there has not been extensive research 
conducted on this field in Norway. This meant that the data for restructuring cases would not 
be readily accessible in a database and would have to be gleaned from annual reports and 
loan documents to manually construct a dataset. To make the job more manageable we have 
limited this thesis by mainly two aspects: time and market. First, we have limited the scope 
to credit events occurring in the time period from January 1st 2005 to December 31st 2011. 
This is both because the high yield bond market, and thus the number of defaults prior to 
2005 was very limited, and that the quality of data on each these restructurings is poorer. 
Second, we have limited the scope to include credit events in what can be perceived as the 
high yield bond market. This cannot be precisely defined, as many smaller firms are not 
rated, but by excluding certain industries and investment grade rated firms, we have 
constructed an approximate high yield sample. Since we did not have an overview of 
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defaults in the Norwegian bond market we manually went through each firm’s loan 
documents. By narrowing the scope down to the Norwegian high yield market, we thus 
filtered out most firms without credit events and still include most defaults.  
The thesis is organized as follows. We start by describing relevant theory on bonds and 
restructurings, and introduce possible determinants and testable implications. The 
subsequent section provides an overview of the Norwegian bond market and insolvency 
legislation in Norway. The Data section describes the data gathering process and features of 
the final sample, after which it discusses methodology and challenges with statistical 
analysis on small samples. Our results are presented in the Findings section, following 
which, we concludes the thesis. 
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2. Theory 
In this section we will present relevant theory, previous research on debt and asset 
restructurings and possible determinants of outcome. We begin by presenting standard 
theory on bonds, which describes characteristics of different types of bonds. We then present 
our framework for determining restructuring cases, before we review relevant studies and 
research on resolution of financial distress. Finally, we introduce possible determinants of 
outcome of distressed situations and the testable implications for our analyses.  
2.1 Bonds 
A bond is in its simplest form a debt contract between two counterparts, the creditor and the 
borrower. The creditor lends an amount to the borrower at issue date and receives interest 
payments on pre-specified dates. At the maturity date the borrower pays back the borrowed 
amount. These terms are all subject to contractual specifications, tailoring the firm’s 
financing to the firm’s needs and investors’ risk appetite. The key contractual specifications 
are the borrowed amount, time to maturity at time of issue, payment schedule, listing, 
technical transaction related issues, law and dispute resolutions and transaction costs (Mjøs, 
2011). 
2.1.1 Types 
There are numerous types of bonds with overlapping characteristics. However, we will only 
present the issue types we later face in our sample, which are the most common ones: plain 
vanilla bonds, zero-coupon bonds, convertible bonds and callable bonds.  
Plain vanilla bonds (also termed ‘regular’, straight bonds or just bonds) are in principle the 
same as bank debt without installments before the maturity date. Bonds issued with less than 
one year until maturity are called certificates. In this thesis we do not distinguish certificates 
from straight bonds because they in principle are the same debt instruments. A bond is 
issued at its settlement date and paid back to the bondholder (creditor) at maturity. The 
issued amount is called the principal. Interest payments on bonds, the compensation to the 
bondholders, are called coupons. Coupons are stated as a percentage of the principal amount 
outstanding and are usually paid quarterly, semi-annually or annually. The coupon can be 
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stated as a fixed percentage (fixed rate bonds) or with a margin to another interest rate, e.g. 
LIBOR (Floating Rate Notes or FRN).  
Zero-Coupon bonds (also termed ‘discount bonds’) have similar characteristics to the plain 
vanilla bonds. For the purpose of this thesis it is only worth mentioning the main differences 
– that they make no interest payments before maturity and are issued at a deep discount to 
their face value. The face value is the amount paid to bondholder at maturity. 
Convertible bonds (also termed ‘Convertibles’) have similar characteristics as the straight 
bond, but in addition to the “regular” bond the bondholder has a right to call the bond. In 
return the borrower pays a lower coupon rate. Calling a convertible bond means converting 
parts or the entire principle amount into equity at a conversion price stated in the contract. 
The option to convert the bond is often limited to certain points in time stated in the contract. 
Callable bonds are also similar to regular bonds, but embed a call option held by the firm to 
redeem the bond before the maturity date. This can typically only be done on pre-specified 
dates, and is exercised by the firm by paying the effective call price. This is defined as: 
 Effective call price = Principal + Accrued Interests + Call Premium 
The call premium is also specified in the contract, and typically decreases as maturity 
approaches. Bonds may be both callable and convertible, a feature that is not unusual 
(Stamland, 2010).  
2.1.2 Seniority and collateral 
A firm’s capital structure represents all claims on the firm’s cash flows and assets. It can be 
seen as layers of capital with different risk profiles, based on the claims’ respective priority 
in case of a default. The priority of a claim is also known as its seniority, and is based on 
contractual agreements.  Common equity has the lowest priority, and is theoretically only 
entitled to residual payments. All debt contracts are senior to both common and preferred 
stock, but the debt is typically split further into three creditor classes. The most senior claims 
are the senior secured, where specific assets of the firm collateralize the creditors’ claims. 
Senior unsecured claims are not secured by any specific assets, but are still ranked above the 
subordinated debt claims.   
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Figure 2.1 - Capital Structure and Seniority 
The table illustrates the ranking of the capital structure in terms of seniority, risk and cost 
of capital.  
    
 Seniority Risk Cost of Capital 
Senior Secured Debt Highest Lowest Lowest 
Senior Unsecured Debt    
Subordinated Debt 
Preferred Stock 
Common Stock Lowest Highest Highest 
    
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between different liability classes and seniority. The 
absolute priority rule states that senior claims should be repaid in full before more junior 
claims receive any payments. In practice however this seldom happens, and subordinated 
claims typically receive more than they are entitled to according to the absolute priority rule 
(Stamland, 2010). This could be due to ambiguity in the debt contracts on how different 
claims should be ranked, but the relative negotiation strength is also an important factor. It is 
claimed that short-term contracts in effect are more senior than longer-term debt, even if 
they contractually are less senior. First, short-term subordinated debt may be repaid in full 
while senior long-term debt is not, just because it matures earlier. Second, since short-term 
debt can force the firm into bankruptcy in the short-term they may use it in negotiations to 
gain more than they are nominally entitled to.  
2.1.3  Risk and ratings 
Bond investors primarily face two types of risks: credit and liquidity risk. Credit risk is the 
risk of your counterparty not fulfilling his obligations, in this case the issuer not meeting his 
interest payments or installments. Credit risk is measured by the credit spread, which is the 
difference between the bond’s and an equal maturity, risk free security’s yield to maturity. 
Liquidity risk is the risk of not being able to sell the bond at market value at any given point 
in time. This thesis will not touch upon the latter.  
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Table 2.1 – Rating defenitions across agencies 
This table summarizes and explains briefly the rating scales used by the three major rating agencies, 
Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.  
 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Description 
In
ve
st
m
en
t g
ra
de
 
AAA Aaa AAA Highest rating 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments AA Aa2 AA 
AA- Aa3 AA- 
A+ A1 A+ Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but 
somewhat susceptible to adverse economic 
conditions 
A A2 A 
A- A3 A- 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments 
but more subject to adverse economic condition BBB Baa2 BBB BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major 
ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial 
and economic conditions 
BB Ba2 BB 
BB- Ba3 BB- 
H
ig
h 
Y
ie
ld
 
B+ B1 B+ More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and 
economic conditions but currently has the capacity to 
meet commitments 
B B2 B 
B- B3 B- 
CCC+ Caa1 
CCC 
Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable 
business, financial and economic conditions to meet 
financial commitments 
CCC Caa2 
CCC- Caa3 
CC Ca Currently highly vulnerable C  
D
ef
au
lt D C DDD 
Payment default on financial commitments   DD 
  D 
 
Sources: Fitch Ratings (2012), Moody’s (2009), Standard & Poor’s (2012) 
 
Large international companies that issue bonds often have official credit ratings from one or 
more of the three, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. These major rating agencies 
analyze the companies’ credit profile and rate them on scales from AAA to default. Table 
2.1 summarizes the rating scale across the three agencies and gives a brief explanation for 
different ratings based on S&P’s descriptions. In the Norwegian bond market most firms are 
not rated, and the implications of this will be discussed in later sections. 
In general we split the bonds in two categories: Investment grade and high yield. The 
investment grade bonds have credit rating BBB- or higher, and high yield have BB+ or 
below. The assumption is that there is a negative correlation between probability of default 
and high credit ratings. 
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2.2 Troubled debt restructurings 
2.2.1 FASB Definitions 
When determining what type of restructuring a company has been trough, we use the US 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s  (FASB) FAS 15, “Accounting by Debtors and 
Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructurings” as a framework. This allows us to be consistent 
with other research in the field (e.g. Hamer, 1985) and to make comparisons with previous 
studies, as most of these are done on U.S. firms. Besides, the definitions are firm-specific 
rather than country-specific, and are just as applicable to Norwegian firms. 
According to FAS 15, two criteria must be met for a restructuring to be a troubled debt 
restructuring. First, a concession must have been granted to the debtor that would otherwise 
not have been considered by the creditor. Second, the borrower must be experiencing 
financial difficulties. Acceptable situations that could be considered financial difficulties 
were clarified in an update from FASB (ASU 2011-01), as one or more of the following 
indicators: 
• The borrower is in default on payment of any of its debt, or it is probable that it will 
be in default in the foreseeable future 
• The borrower is in bankruptcy 
• There is substantial doubt about the borrower’s ability to continue as a going concern 
• The borrower’s securities have been delisted 
• The borrower has insufficient cash flow to service its debt 
• Without modification, borrower cannot obtain funds from other sources other than 
existing creditors at an effective rate equal to current market rate for similar debt for 
a non-troubled borrower 
The following categories are described in FAS 15 as troubled debt restructurings 
• Transfer from the debtor to the creditor of receivables from third parties, real estate, 
or other assets to satisfy fully or partially a debt (including a transfer resulting from 
foreclosure or repossession). 
• Issuance or other granting of an equity interest to the creditor by the debtor to satisfy 
fully or partially a debt unless the equity interest is granted pursuant to existing terms 
for converting the debt into an equity interest. 
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• Modification of terms of a debt, such as one or a combination of: 
1. Reduction (absolute or contingent) of the stated interest rate for the remaining 
original life of the debt. 
2. Extension of the maturity date or dates at a stated interest rate lower than the 
current market rate for new debt with similar risk. 
3. Reduction (absolute or contingent) of the face amount or maturity amount of 
the debt as stated in the instrument or other agreement. 
4. Reduction (absolute or contingent) of accrued interest. 
A company may use one or a combination of several of these, and as noted in the Standard, 
the list is not exhaustive.  
A restructuring may still also include other amendments to the debt contracts that are not 
covered by the categories above. A frequently observed amendment to the loan agreement is 
some sort of change of covenants. The most commonly amended covenants in Norwegian 
bond restructurings are 
- Extension of maturity 
- Allowance for Payment in Kind (Kind refers usually to debt) 
- Reduction of the contract’s minimum debt to equity ratio 
For our purposes a reorganization of the categories will be useful, which we will return to 
after the next subsection.  
2.2.2 Asset Restructurings vs. Debt Restructuring 
Another perspective on types of restructuring that can be instructive when determining 
restructuring issues under different scenarios, is used in John (1993) and Hotchkiss, John, 
Mooradian and Thorburn (2008). They begin by splitting a firm’s liabilities into hard and 
soft contracts. The hard contracts are typically debt contracts, where the debtor is obligated 
to make periodic payments to the creditor. Other examples are trade payables and 
government charges. If these payments are not paid on time, the contract is violated and 
creditors may legally pursue the debtor to receive their claims. On the other hand we have 
the soft contracts, comprising common stock and preferred stock. The holders of such 
contracts cannot demand regular payments from the firm. To a larger degree they receive 
residual payments made at the management’s discretion. In particular, such payouts depend 
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on the liquidity of the firm, and may be suspended for periods without any legal 
consequences.  
A similar categorization can be made for the assets based on liquidity. The liquid part of a 
firm’s assets includes cash and various marketable securities. The illiquid or hard assets 
comprise long-term investments that may not be sold as easily and converted to cash.  
Based on these categories John (1993) naturally defines financial distress as follows:  
A firm is in financial distress at a given point in time when the liquid assets of the firm are 
not sufficient to meet the current requirements of its hard contracts.  
In other words, there is a mismatch between the hard and soft parts of the firm’s balance 
sheet, and solutions to the financial distress are those that rectify this mismatch.  
One set of options can be categorized as asset restructurings. This focuses on the asset side 
of the balance sheet and involves liquidating all or parts of the hard assets in order to 
generate liquid assets to pay off current obligations to the hard contracts. The other set of 
options is categorized as debt restructuring and focuses on the firm’s liabilities. This 
category includes several mechanisms, but have in common that they want to soften the 
contracts to reduce the financial distress. Examples are renegotiations of the hard contracts to 
reduce or defer payments, or replacing hard contracts with softer securities, for example 
through a debt to equity conversion. A third restructuring category should also be mentioned, 
which involves raising additional liquidity by issuing new financial claims on the firm. This 
leaves the original contracts unaltered, but if the new contracts are softer with longer 
maturity it may solve the financial distress.  
2.2.3 Restructuring Categories 
To explain different outcomes of a restructuring with financial data we have to choose 
categories that describe the severity of the restructuring and the characteristics of the firm. 
As liquidation is the most severe possible final outcome of a distressed situation it is a 
natural first category. Second, as John (1993) argued above, troubled debt restructurings can 
be divided in two distinct categories based on what side of the balance sheet it involves, 
namely asset and debt restructurings. The latter can combined with the third option 
mentioned, raising additional capital, to comprise financial restructurings. This category will 
encompass every change a firm makes on the financing side of the balance sheet. 
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Liquidation Financial Restructuring Sale of Assets 
Postponement  
of obligations 
Changes in  
Capital Structure 
Figure 2.2 – Restructuring Categories 
This figure illustrates our categorization of troubled debt restructuring cases. Liquidated firms form 
a natural category, while we have split the successful restructurings in those involving the firm’s 
assets and those involving only the liability side of the balance sheet. This latter category is further 
split between firms succeeding to only postpone their obligations and those that in some way alter the 
capital structure through the restructuring.  
 
 
 
Based on FAS 15’s definition of trouble debt restructurings we find a further split of the 
financial restructuring category useful. The most serious category would include firms that 
have made changes in the capital structure. This includes debt to equity conversions, raising 
additional capital, debt buybacks and changes in covenants such as reduction of principal 
amount. All these have in common that creditors effectively forgive some of their claims. 
The second category comprises the least severe restructuring cases, and we call this 
Postponement of obligations. This category includes solutions where extension of maturity 
and changes in covenants such as allowance of payment in kind has been sufficient. Figure 
2.2 summarizes these categories.   
2.2.4 Restructuring issues 
The kind of restructuring method a firm chooses depends on the relative costs and benefits 
for the firm (Hotchkiss et al. 2008). The efficiency of a restructuring method can be 
measured by the loss in firm value during the restructuring period, and we may assume that 
the firm will prefer the method with the lowest marginal cost. The costs depend on several 
factors, like the firm’s capital structure, institutional framework and market efficiency. 
However, the most efficient method from an overall perspective may not always be the 
optimal outcome for all stakeholders. Different claimants have different interests, some in 
conflict with maximizing firm value. Since aligning these interests may be challenging, the 
negotiation strength and skills of the claimants will also affect the final outcome.  
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2.2.4.1 Asset restructuring 
If the secondary asset market is illiquid, financial restructurings will typically dominate, 
since the costs of asset restructurings are likely to be high. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
studied the costs of liquidating assets due to financial distress and found three determinants 
of market liquidity, which they called (i) fungibility (the number of distinct uses and users 
for a particular asset), (ii) participation restrictions (regulations on foreign acquisitions and 
anti-trust restrictions), and (iii) credit constraints in the industry. Based on this they argue 
that distressed assets may be sold at significant discounts if there are few possible buyers and 
if the whole industry is financially distressed.  
Several papers from the U.S. have found asset restructuring to be frequently used by 
financially distressed firms. Brown, James and Mooradian (1991) also found that distressed 
firms selling assets are typically multidivisional firms or firms with multiple subsidiary 
operations, and contrary to the firm not selling assets only have one division. Further they 
find indications that creditors have influence over the liquidation decision, since the greater 
portion of short-term bank debt, the more likely sales proceed are to be paid out to creditors.  
The debt level seems in general to be an important determinant of asset sales. According to 
studies by Ofek (1993) and Kruse (2002), the probability of asset sales increases in debt 
level However, measuring aggregated debt levels across different industries may be 
unfortunate, especially for smaller samples. What is perceived as a high or low debt level 
may differ substantially between different industries. In one industry a debt to asset ratio of 
0.8 may be normal, while in another it may be seen as dangerously high. When analyzing 
debt levels without controlling for such industry specific differences, we may reach dubious 
conclusions. One solution to this potential issue is found in Kruse (2002) and Pulvino 
(1998), who also test what they call the firm’s debt capacity. According to them a firm has a 
low additional debt capacity if the long term debt ratio is above industry average and the 
current ratio is below industry average. They create a dummy variable assigning the value 
one for firms fulfilling these criteria. They both find a strong positive relation between firms 
with low debt capacity and asset sales.  
In addition Kruse (2002) found a positive relation between industry growth and the 
probability of asset sales, which supports Shleifer and Vishy’s (1992) arguments above. 
When the rest of the industry is in distress the price of an asset sale is likely to be lower, 
making other restructuring methods more attractive. 
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Even though asset restructuring is a common remedy of financial distress, John (1993) in his 
survey of restructuring literature finds evidence suggesting that it in most cases is used in 
conjunction with debt restructuring.  
2.2.4.2 Debt restructuring 
Most theory and research on distressed debt restructuring focuses on the choice between out-
of-court workouts and Chapter 11 restructuring, which is a different question than what this 
paper examines. Nevertheless, we may obtain important insight in the determinants of 
restructuring method from this research, as many of the arguments can be extended to fit our 
focus. 
To understand the issues of debt restructuring, a useful framework is to look at the choice 
between liquidation and some sort of debt restructuring. If the firm is economically unviable 
the optimal solution is to liquidate the firm and sell the assets to recover as much as possible 
of the creditors and shareholders’ value. But for an economically viable firm, liquidating 
would be suboptimal, and stakeholders would forego a positive value by not restructuring 
the firm for continued operations. Let us denote this value ΔV, as the difference in firm 
value between the restructuring solution and liquidation. When this is positive, it would be 
possible to restructure the firm’s claims in a way such that all claimants would be better off. 
The larger ΔV is, the stronger are the claimholders’ incentives to restructure.  
Let us first consider a scenario where both creditors and the firm have perfect information, 
the debt contracts are complete and perfectly enforceable, and creditors’ interests are 
aligned. In such a scenario a distressed situation can always be solved efficiently as long as 
the ΔV is positive, as noted by for example Hotchkiss et al. (2008). In practice however, 
when the above assumptions are violated a costless resolution of distress do not exist, and 
give rise to a set of issues we can categorize as creditor coordination problems. Gilson, John 
and Lang (1990) sub-categorize the coordination problems in an instructive way for 
exploring them further, respectively as (i) holdout problems, (ii) information asymmetry and 
(iii) conflicts of interest among different groups of creditors.  
2.2.4.3 Holdout problems 
The holdout problem is a well-known issue for both debt and equity securities when they are 
diffusely held. In a restructuring process it may appear when bondholders are given an 
exchange offer with the option to swap their bonds with a package of new securities or keep 
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their original bonds. If the bondholders expect the bonds to be worth more after a successful 
exchange offer than the new securities, they prefer keeping their bonds while the other 
bondholders accept the offer. But since all bondholders have the same incentives no one will 
accept, and the restructuring proposal will fail. Two solutions are used to mitigate this 
problem. One option is coercive participation in the exchange offer, where all members of 
the credit class must participate if the proposal receives a majority of the votes in a 
bondholder meeting. Another option is to design the offer such that the loss of not 
participating exceeds the benefits, for example by removing or amending various covenants 
for the original bonds (John, 1993).  
2.2.4.4 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is another important explanation of the creditor coordination 
problem. Typically, the management and insiders of the firm have more information about 
the state and value of the firm than outside creditors. This information asymmetry tends to 
increase as the number of creditors increase, since each creditor has weaker incentives to 
monitor the firm closely. When this is the case, the creditors do not know the true value of 
the restructuring proposals from the firm to them. They also know that when management 
acts in the interests of the shareholders, they have incentives to misprice the firm’s value. 
With symmetrical information and a single creditor Brown (1989) argues that a private 
workout always will be successful. But as showed by Giammarino (1989), asymmetric 
information may lead creditors to reject mutually beneficial restructurings. Another 
consequence of information asymmetry can be extension of the negotiation period where 
several restructuring proposals are necessary before an agreement is reached (Carapeto, 
2004). This is harmful to the firm value, since the process itself is costly and the firm’s 
strategic maneuverability is limited during this period. 
2.2.4.5 Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest between different creditors can also create difficulties when trying to 
resolve financial distress, and is closely linked to the seniority of claims. A typical firm has a 
variety of creditors, from bondholders to trade creditors, the government and banks. When 
restructuring debt contracts the claims on a firm’s cash flow is also altered, and especially 
for highly levered firm the creditors often have conflicting interests in the restructuring 
process. On one hand you have the senior creditors, whose value decreases with increased 
risk. Since their claims are secured, they have first priority when the values are distributed. 
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The result is that they often prefer liquidation, even when suboptimal, since they are sure to 
recover most of their claims.  On the other hand are the junior or subordinated creditors. In a 
distressed situation their claims are somewhat similar to equity and equities’ option-like 
features, since they have limited downside and a large potential upside. They would prefer 
restructuring for continued operations, even for economically unviable firms (Hotchkiss et 
al., 2008). Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) are among those modeling these issues of multiple 
creditor classes.  
Gilson, John and Lang (1990) also show that the probability of a successful out-of-court 
restructuring is higher when a firm has fewer distinct classes of debt. This is intuitive, since 
fewer conflicts of interest exist, and those that still are present are easier to coordinate. 
Another observation they made was that the greater portion of bank debt the firm had, the 
more common workouts were. At first this may be counterintuitive given the above 
argument that secured debt more often prefers liquidation. But as Gilson et al (1990) argues, 
banks usually are better informed, especially if they are the firm’s dominant creditor. This 
may reduce informational asymmetries, making a renegotiation easier. With a high portion 
of bank debt, the importance of restructuring increases as well, forcing the bank to 
internalize more of the restructuring costs. However, not all studies have confirmed this. 
Frank and Torous (1994) did not find more bank debt among out-of-court restructuring 
cases. One posed explanation was that their sample included larger firms, typically less 
reliant on bank debt. These firms also use syndicated bank debt to a greater extent, and 
involving several banks increases information asymmetry, conflicts of interest and holdout 
problems.  
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein’s (1994) results are also somewhat contrary to Gilson et al. 
(1990) and more in line with our original argument that senior debt is not as conducive to 
debt restructurings. They find that banks rarely forgive principal, and explain it with their 
security and seniority. Instead they saw that bank restructurings typically involved loosening 
some covenants, like extending maturity, delaying interest payments or waiving covenants. 
Another characteristic was that as they loosened one element they often tightened other parts 
of the contracts, for example by converting an unsecured line of credit into a secured line as 
the maturity was extended. Chatterjee, Dillon and Ramirez (1996) support these findings, 
showing that firms ending in Chapter 11 have significantly higher levels of bank debt.  
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The amount of trade credit and number of trade creditors are also found to affect the 
outcome of financial distress. Gilson et al. (1990) argue that coordination problems are 
particularly severe for trade credit, since this debt is typically owed to a large number of 
trade creditors with heterogeneous claims. This makes it hard to use exchange offers to 
restructure the debt, as firms do for publicly traded bonds. Coordinating a consensus among 
trade creditors is also difficult, as these tend to be both acrimonious and unsophisticated 
according to practitioners Gilson et al. (1990). Chatterjee et al. (1996) confirm this, finding 
significantly lower levels of trade credits among firms avoiding Chapter 11. 
Conflicts of interest can also be present between creditors and management. When a 
manager receives private perquisites, status or other pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits 
from his job that he cannot get elsewhere, he or she is interested in keeping the job. Due to 
this, the management has incentives to not voluntarily reveal if a firm is economically 
unviable. Another possible conflict of interest between management and creditor that may 
occur in financial distress is that managers have incentives to undertake high risk projects 
with negative net present value (Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992, and White, 1996). This can 
happen if managers do not risk losing much more if the project fails, but get a significant 
share of the upside if it succeeds, at the expense of bondholders.   
Shareholders also have incentives to present the terms of a restructuring proposal as more 
favorable than they really are to creditors. This introduces another conflict of interest 
between shareholders and creditors. De Angelo et al. (1990) indicate that firm management, 
acting on behalf of shareholders, use accounting accruals to influence negotiations with 
lenders. Since we assume that creditors are aware of this overvaluation problem, a ‘lemons 
problem’ may arise causing restructuring failure.  
2.2.4.6 Other issues and research observations 
As discussed above, economically viable firms should be the ones succeeding with a 
restructuring. One would believe that these firms are characterized by better performance 
measures, leading to a positive relation between performance and successful resolution of 
distress. But Asquith, Gertner and Sharfstein (1994) do not find evidence of such a relation. 
They find that once in economic distress, a firm with better performance measures, like 
operating income or book-to-market equity ratios, just as often ends in bankruptcy or sell 
assets as firms any other firm. Chatterjee et al (1996), however, find such a relation, where 
firms filing for Chapter 11 have a significantly lower EBITD margin than those restructuring 
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out of court. Their results suggest that firms succeeding with a voluntary restructuring indeed 
have better economic prospects.  
One of the strongest determinants of successful restructuring in previous studies is firm size. 
Moulton and Thomas (1993), Gilson et al. (1990) and Chatterjee et al. (1996) have all found 
evidence that larger firms have better prospects at succeeding with a restructuring attempt 
than smaller firms. This result is due to several reasons. First, since large firms have more 
and varied assets they are better prepared to survive substantial losses and write-downs of 
firm value than smaller firms. Second, they are also more likely to have some viable 
businesses that the restructured firm can rely on, or assets they can sell to generate cash for 
continued operations. Larger firms typically also have more administrative staff with better 
skills in maneuvering distressed firms, and if not they have more financial strength to hire 
consultants with expertise in helping them finding a solution to the distress situation.  
Moulton and Thomas (1993) also emphasizes that the very size of large firms make 
liquidation or acquisition less likely. Few investors have the resources to acquire very large 
bankrupt firms or all of its assets, while there are more investors or firms willing to take over 
a smaller firm in bankruptcy. In addition, antitrust regulations may come into play for 
mergers and acquisitions of very large firms within an industry. The sum of these arguments 
seems to give large firms a competitive advantage in resolving financial distress.  
Jensen (1989) argues that highly levered firms prefer private restructurings rather than filing 
for Chapter 11. The reason is that when the debt ratio is very high a majority of the marginal 
cost of restructuring falls on the creditors. Chapter 11 restructuring is perceived to be both 
more expensive and value deteriorating than a private restructuring, since it typically draws 
out in time and sends signals that the firm is it deeper troubles. Creditors then have an 
incentive to restructure out of court, since the marginal cost of reduced firm value is 
perceived as higher than the reduction of claims.  
Empirically there is evidence both for and against this prediction. On one hand Chatterjee et 
al. (1996) found that firms filing for Chapter 11 had significantly lower leverage ratios than 
firms restructuring out of court. But others, like Franks and Torous (1994), made the 
opposite observation where Chapter 11 firms had more debt. Others again have found no 
significance for debt level as a determinant, like Gilson et al. (1990). The conflicting results 
may be due to sample differences. Franks and Torous (1994) only used firms with public 
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debt in their sample, which typically are larger. For such firms other factors may be more 
crucial, since they often have a higher debt capacity.  
2.3 Determinants of outcome and testable implications 
The theory and previous research presented give indications of the determinants that might 
explain the outcomes of financial distress. Based on this, we present the possible 
determinants that we will later test empirically. The determinants are categorized partly 
based on Chatterjee et al.’s (1996) empirical paper, as those expressing degree of economic 
distress, coordination problems and leverage and liquidity levels. In addition, we look at 
asset composition and other firm characteristics.  
Table 2.2 - Summarized determinants of outcome 
This table summarizes the categories of determinants we test in our analysis, the variables 
we use as measures of the respective determinants and our hypothesized relations.  
      
 Determinant Variables Hypothesis 
Degree of 
Economic Distress 
EBITDA-margin 
EBITDA/Total Assets 
The more troubled firms would be liquidated and the 
less trouble firms would be allowed only postponing 
obligations 
   
Creditor 
Coordination 
Problems 
Credit / Total Assets 
Different types of Debt / 
Total Debt 
#Public Contracts 
Complex capital structures can lead to misalignments 
in stakeholders’ view of maximizing value and 
therefore will firms with complex capital structures 
be more likely to be liquidated 
   
Liquidity Current ratio (CR) 
CR adj. for industry avg. 
Firms with low additional debt capacity are more 
likely to sell assets in a restructuring 
   
Leverage Liabilities / Total Assets 
Industry adj. debt ratio 
LTD / Total Assets 
The higher leverage the more severe the restructuring 
is likely to be. We expect to find less leverage on the 
firms only postponing obligations 
   
Asset Liquidity Intangibles / Total Assets 
PP&E / Total Assets 
Firms with assets that are easy to sell will more often 
be forced to a sale of assets in a restructuring 
   
Size Total Assets 
Sales 
Larger firms will be more likely to sell 
assets/business divisions in a restructuring 
   
Age #Years since start up An older firm has more and better relations to 
creditors and are therefore less likely to be liquidated 
        
 
2.3.1 Degree of Economic Distress 
The degree of economic distress a firm is facing should determine if the company is to be 
liquidated or restructured. Ideally, economically nonviable firms should be liquidated and 
viable firms should restructure. But White (1994) shows that managers in the U.S. are 
incentivized by Chapter 11 to restructure rather than liquidate, and hence there are a number 
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of economically nonviable firms attempting a restructuring. The empirical implication tested 
in this thesis is that economically nonviable firms actually are liquidated. Since this thesis is 
looking at final outcomes, the most recent restructurings may still end up as liquidation 
cases, i.e. our restructuring categories may be biased. This could lead to our null hypothesis 
not being rejected more often than it should.  
To test this we will measure economic distress in terms of past performance, more 
specifically the ratio of EBITDA to sales and total assets. We expect to find better 
performance among restructuring cases than liquidation cases, and that firms postponing 
obligations have better EBITDA ratios than firms undergoing more comprehensive 
restructurings.  
2.3.2 Coordination Problems 
Coordination problems among creditors are found to be among the major obstacles to a 
successful resolution of financial distress. We will test several of the implications and 
findings from previous research concerning these issues. 
A common observation is that the more different creditors a firm has, the harder it is to find 
a quick restructuring solution. We hypothesize as Gilson et al. (1990) that firms with several 
distinct creditor classes more often end with liquidation or asset sales than those managing to 
restructure the debt terms. Since bonds may be traded publicly and have more dispersed 
ownership, we also believe firms with more such financing show similar trends.  
The dominating type of public debt should also help determining the outcome of distress. 
Following the reasoning from Hotchkiss et al. (2008), when most of the firm’s debt is senior 
secured the creditors may get full recovery from liquidating and prefer this to a more 
uncertain outcome from a restructuring. Hence, firms liquidating or selling assets should 
have more senior secured debt than other firms. When the majority of the bonds are 
unsecured, those creditors will not be left with much if the firm is liquidated in distress. 
More often they would prefer to waive some of their claims and hope the firm will recover 
from distress. We would thus believe that firms with a lot of unsecured debt more often 
manage to make creditors agree on a debt restructuring.  
Both Gilson et al. (1990) and Chatterjee et al. (1996) find the amount of trade credit to be an 
important determinant of financial distress outcome, because trade creditors are typically 
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dispersed and not very sophisticated. We believe such a relation should be evident among 
firms in the Norwegian bond market as well, where firms with high levels of trade credit are 
less able to find easy solutions to their financial troubles. Thus, they will more often 
liquidate, sell assets or be forced into bigger capital restructurings. 
An interesting factor in previous research is the level of bank debt. Some, like Gilson et al. 
(1990), found the level of bank debt to positively affect the probability of restructuring 
success, arguing that banks may be better informed than other creditors. Others, like 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), has made opposite observations, indicating that 
banks seldom make concessions on their claims. This would imply that firms with more 
bank debt more often is liquidated or forced to sell assets, since the banks are secured by the 
firm’s assets and are not as exposed to losses. The dominant effect will depend on the 
anatomy of firms in the Norwegian bond market, and more specifically on our sample. From 
previous research there are indications that the positive effect of bank debt is more evident 
for samples with smaller firms, where the bank debt is a large part of the total debt and owed 
to only one or two banks.  
In addition to the level of bank debt itself, we want to analyze if firms with and without 
access to bank financing behave differently when in distress. A common perception is that 
firms with bank debt are better quality firms, since banks have more restrictive policies on 
lending. This should induce a selection issue in our sample with the better quality firms with 
bank debt on one hand, and the poorer quality firms with less access to bank debt on the 
other. If this selection is prominent, the firms with access to bank financing may be less 
responsive to some determinants of outcome than firms without bank debt, and vice versa.  
2.3.3 Liquidity 
According to Kruse (2002), firms with low additional debt capacity are more likely to sell 
assets to navigate through short-term liquidity problems. These are firms with both their 
leverage ratio above industry average and their current ratio below industry average. We 
expect firms in the Norwegian bond market to behave similarly, and find lower additional 
debt capacity among asset selling firms. Liquidation cases should also be characterized by 
low debt capacity, since many firms go bankrupt due to lack of funding.  
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2.3.4 Leverage  
Whether high leverage is a significant determinant of restructuring method has both been 
proved and disproved by previous research. We will test the prediction by Jensen (1989) that 
Gilson et al. (1990), Franks and Torous (1994) and Chatterjee et al. (1996) have tested, that 
highly levered firms, if possible, avoid large and time consuming restructurings.  
On the other hand, firms with high leverage are in deeper trouble than less levered firms in 
case of an economic downturn. High leverage per se is not a problem as long as the firm has 
sales, or more importantly incoming cash flows, to meet their obligations when they are due. 
Startup firms in particular often use a lot of debt to finance startup investments, but are not 
obliged to start repaying until the date they expect to start earning money. But when sales 
disappoints or deviate from expected cash flow, firms with higher leverage must make larger 
amendments to their financing structure than firms with less debt to adapt to the situation. 
The reason is that their obligations towards creditors cannot be postponed in the same 
manner as towards equity. Thus, given that a firm is in financial distress, we expect the 
highly levered firms to undertake larger restructurings to resolve their problems.  
Another indication of high leverage is very high interest expenses. If a firm has large interest 
expenses compared to sales it indicates that their way of financing is expensive, and if these 
are too high over time it may not be sustainable. When this is the case, an extension of 
maturity or interest payments is not enough to solve the underlying problem. The firm will 
either have to refinance their debt to make it cheaper or scale down operations to a 
sustainable level by selling assets.  Based on this we believe to find that firms undertaking 
large debt or asset restructurings make bigger interest payments prior to the restructuring 
than those where a postponement of obligations is sufficient.  
2.3.5 Asset liquidity 
When a large fraction of a firm’s values are intangible, creditors obviously recovers less of 
their claims through an asset sale or liquidation. Thus, we expect liquidation and asset sale 
cases to have less intangible assets on their balance sheets than those renegotiating or 
restructuring their debt. Furthermore, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predict, the more liquid 
a firm’s assets are, the greater is the probability of selling it for a decent price. This should 
imply that firms selling assets have the most tangible fixed assets, since these are usually 
sold in asset restructurings.   
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2.3.6 Size 
Several studies have found size to be among the most significant determinants of a 
successful restructuring. Both Gilson et al. (1990), Moulton and Thomas (1993) and 
Chatterjee et al. (1996) have found indications that larger firms have a competitive 
advantage in the restructuring process. We expect to find similar trends in the Norwegian 
market, where firms succeeding in restructuring the firm are larger in general, measured by 
total assets. 
Brown, James and Mooradian (1991) found evidence that larger multidivisional firms are 
more likely to restructure by selling assets or business divisions. Hence, we expect the asset 
sale category to be the largest of the four. 
2.3.7 Age 
There is no research indicating that age is a significant determinant in resolving financial 
distress, but under certain circumstances it might represent underlying contributing factors 
that are harder to measure. Older firms have typically grown tighter bonds to customers, 
suppliers and creditors. If these relations are good they will help lower the perceived 
information asymmetries and the different stakeholders might stretch a bit further to help 
keep the firm away from bankruptcy. Firms that have been in the game for a while may also 
have a track record of previous achievements earning the firm a reputation that can help 
convince creditors that the firm still is viable. In addition, an older firm may have a stronger 
organization that is more resilient to periods of financial distress, and also more knowledge 
and experience to handle tough situations. Based on this, we hypothesize that older firms are 
more successful resolving financial distress and because of relations less likely to be forced 
into an asset sale. 
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3. The Norwegian market 
To relate the theory to the specific market this thesis will cover we have included a brief 
introduction of the Norwegian corporate bond market, key market participants and governing 
laws on insolvency and bankruptcy. 
3.1 The Norwegian corporate bond market 
3.1.1 Market size 
Over the past decade the Norwegian bond market has grown from NOK 58 billion in 
outstanding amount to NOK 244 billion at the end of 2011. Figure 3.1 Panel A illustrates the 
development in market size from 2000 until December 31st 2011. We see that the market has 
grown every year since 2000, with one exception in 2009 when it declined by 5 percent. This 
is most likely the effect of the credit crisis, when many firms were facing a though financial 
situation and investors were reallocating their wealth to more secure assets than corporate 
bonds. Most of the restructuring cases that will be analyzed later in this thesis are from this 
period. 
Figure 3.1 Panel B shows the cumulative growth in outstanding corporate bonds and bank 
loans. Corporate bonds have grown at a higher pace since 2000 than bank loans. Based on 
this the corporate bonds seem to have become a more important part of corporate firms 
capital structure. Note that this is only a relative comparison, and over the same period we 
have actually seen a slight decline in debt to capital from 63 percent to 60 percent (SSB, 
2006, 2008 and 2011). 
The process of determining the corporate bond issuers will be described under 3.1.3 Issuers. 
 29 
Figure 3.1 – Outstanding corporate bonds 
Panel A shows outstanding amount of corporate bonds in the Norwegian market since 2000. 
The data is divided into listed and not listed bond issues, where the former ones either are 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) or the Oslo Alternative Bond Market (ABM). 
Panel B compares the growth in outstanding amount of corporate bonds with corporate 
bank debt. This indicates that corporate bonds have become a relatively more important 
source of financing. (Panel A figures are in BNOK, Dec 31st) 
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Norwegian bond issues are either listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) or Oslo Alternative 
Bond Market (ABM), or not listed at all. ABM was started in 2005 as a reaction to the 
European regulations that made listing of bonds on stock exchanges a more comprehensive 
and costly process. Listing on Oslo ABM has less demanding requirements with respect to  
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Figure 3.2 - Number of Norwegian corporate bond issues per year 
The figure shows the number of issues in the Norwegian corporate bond market from 2000 
to 2012. The 2012 column includes issues from Q1 only. The bonds are listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange (OSE) or the Oslo Alternative Bond Market (ABM).  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
elements like issue prospectus and reporting standards. While the OSE dominates this 
market in terms of volume, the not listed bonds dominate the number of issued bonds. We 
can also see that, since initiation, ABM’s market share has grown from 4 percent in 2005 to 
a peak of 33 percent in 2007 with NOK 50 billion. In 2011 the volume was down to NOK 15 
billion, or 10 percent of total issued amount this year. 
The total issued amount per year has also grown, from NOK 10 billion in 2000 to the current 
peak of NOK 150 billion in 2007. The decline during the credit crisis is more visible when 
looking at new issues rather than outstanding amount, as the issued amount halves in 2008. 
This has picked up again, and both gross and net issues are expected to grow even more in 
years to come (Dun & Bradstreet, 2010). From Figure 3.3 below we see that during Q1 2012 
the issued amount was more than NOK 46 billion.  
0	  100	  
200	  300	  
400	  500	  
600	  
2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  OSE	   ABM	   Not	  listed	  
 31 
Figure 3.3 – Issued amount 
The figure reports issued amounts in the Norwegian bond market excluding financial and 
government bonds from 2000 to 2012. The 2012 column includes issues from Q1 only. The 
alternative bond market (ABM) was started in 2005 as a reaction on the new regulations the 
EU imposed on bond issuers. The ABM market share in 2004 includes bonds initially issued 
on OSE or without listing later listed on ABM. (Figures in BNOK) 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
Going forward we are likely to see an increase in both volume and issues in global and 
Norwegian bond markets. These expectations are based on the introduction of higher capital 
requirements for financial institutions imposed by Basel III, which effectively means that 
more firms have to use the bond market for debt financing (Dun & Bradstreet, 2010). 
3.1.2 Liquidity 
In 2006 the volume of bonds traded in Norway was only NOK 690 billion, which was only 
0.27 times the volume of the equities on Oslo Stock Exchange. Over the past six years the 
liquidity in the Norwegian bond market has improved significantly, and in 2011 it had 
exceeded the Norwegian equity market, with a turnover of NOK 1,601 billion (see Figure 
3.4). This is 1.05 times more than the equity market, which is closer to the characteristics of 
mature bond markets according to World Federation of Exchanges (2012). It should however 
be noted that this metric has improved by reduced turnover in the equity market as well, 
which has dropped by 40 percent in the same period.  
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Figure 3.4 - Annual turnover  
The figure shows aggregated numbers from the Norwegian bond markets, OSE and ABM, 
and the Norwegian equity markets, Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess. Not listed bonds 
could be traded over the counter, but we have been unable to find reliable data for these 
turnover rates.  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
3.1.3 Issuers 
Bank, Public sector and Finance are the three most active bond-issuing sectors in Norway. 
After this the energy and utilities sector is fourth both in terms of volume and issues. In this 
thesis we have excluded financial institutions and government secured entities, as 
practitioners do not consider these as part of the corporate bond market, and the bankruptcy 
dynamics of financial institutions are different from that of other firms. 
Table 3.1 is an aggregated overview of bond issuers in the Norwegian bond market since 
1993 through 2011, and we can see the sectors we have excluded include more than three 
quarters of the issued bonds. 
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Table 3.1 - Issues in the Norwegian bond market 1993-2011 
The table summarizes the total issued volume in the Norwegian bond market from 1993 
through 2011 including all sectors. All figures are retrieved from the Stamdata database.  
	   	   	   	  
Industry	   Volume	  (mNOK)	   Number	  of	  Issues	   Average	  Volume	  (mNOK)	  
Public	  Sector	   	  2	  941	  001	  	   3	  669	  	   	  714	  	   	  
Bank	   	  1	  819	  143	  	   	  6	  802	  	   	  142	  	   	  
Finance	   	  995	  391	  	   	  1	  214	  	   	  348	  	   	  
Energy	  and	  Utility	   	  366	  830	  	   	  1	  495	  	   	  219	  	   	  
Oil	  and	  Gas	   	  175	  698	  	   	  306	  	   	  423	  	   	  
Property	   	  107	  930	  	   	  627	  	   	  158	  	   	  
Industry	   	  95	  268	  	   	  404	  	   	  209	  	   	  
Food	  and	  Beverages	   	  70	  600	  	   	  303	  	   	  215	  	   	  
Service	   	  61	  758	  	   	  336	  	   	  166	  	   	  
Shipping	   	  55	  955	  	   	  173	  	   	  249	  	   	  
Transportation	   	  52	  992	  	   	  231	  	   	  216	  	   	  
Wholesale	  and	  Retail	   	  45	  410	  	   	  277	  	   	  150	  	   	  
Telecom/IT	   	  38	  834	  	   	  168	  	   	  221	  	   	  
Pulp	  and	  Paper	   	  14	  656	  	   	  48	  	   	  277	  	   	  
Media	   	  11	  748	  	   	  37	  	   	  267	  	   	  
Fishery	   	  6	  916	  	   	  25	  	   	  238	  	   	  
NA	   	  3	  197	  	   	  51	  	   	  53	  	   	  
Insurance	   	  1	  017	  	   	  10	  	   	  102	  	   	  
Auto	   	  41	  	   	  2	  	   	  21	  	   	  
Total	  Volume	  	   	  6	  864	  385	  	  
	   	  #	  Issues	  
	  
	  16	  176	  	  
	  Average	  issued	  size	  
	   	  
	  424	  	   	  
	   	   	   	  
 
3.1.4 Investors 
The investors in the Norwegian bond market are mainly Norwegian, with international 
investors holding about a quarter of the market, measured in volume. The less regulated 
ABM-market has historically had a lower share of international investors, but this has 
increased and now there are slightly more international holders of the ABM bonds. We have 
not found data on ownership structure in the non listed bonds. 
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Figure 3.5 - Ownership structure in the Norwegian Corporate Bond Market  
This figure shows the relative share of Norwegian vs. international owners of bonds in the 
Norwegian bond market. ABM is reported in the left columns and Oslo Stock Exchange in 
the right. We see that approximately three quarters of the investors are now Norwegian. The 
share of international investors at ABM has increased from 2007, and is now a larger than 
the international share at OSE. Figures are extracted from Oslo Alternative Bond market 
and Oslo Stock Exchange statistics. 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
3.1.5 Norwegian Trustee 
The Norwegian Trustee, Norsk Tillitsmann, is an intermediate between bond issuers and 
bondholders. The trustee represents the bondholders and may act on behalf them. There is no 
legal obligation to use a trustee in Norway. However, approximately 95 percent use one and 
out of these, 90 percent use the Norwegian Trustee. Further, the bond exchanges require its 
use to approve a listing of bonds (Sandvik, 2011). 
The trustee has three main tasks. First, before the issue they help preparing the loan 
documents. Second, they monitor the bond issuers and make sure they comply with the 
covenants in their debt contracts. Third, if these covenants are breached the trustee handles 
the crisis management, including managing restructuring negotiation. 
Bonds are often owned by many investors, which may cause problems if the issuer needs to 
contact them to restructure a contract. However, by using a trustee the issuer only relates to 
one party in this process, making it easier to coordinate a restructuring. Another benefit is 
that the trustee may undertake minor changes and make clarifications of the contracts 
without a bondholders’ meeting. 
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3.1.6 Bond rating problems 
The largest bond investors in the Norwegian market are life insurance companies and 
pension funds. These are funds with a low risk profile that allows them only to invest in 
investment grade bonds, and they tend to sell bonds that are downgraded to high yield. 
However, there are only a handful of Norwegian bond issuers that have an official rating, for 
instance Statoil and Hydro. This could be an issue to low risk profile investors, as they need 
to confirm the investment grading of the bonds they invest in. In the absence of official 
ratings they use so-called “shadow ratings”, which are unofficial credit ratings performed at 
the time of a bond issue, usually by the investment bank issuing the bond. The Norwegian 
Fund and Asset Management Association collects these ratings for investors to form their 
own opinion of a firm’s credit rating, but unlike official ratings these are not continuously 
updated. This implies that investors in the Norwegian bond market to a larger degree will 
have to analyze and monitor the issuers’ credit risk themselves, which may be a costly 
process.  
3.2 Norwegian bankruptcy proceedings 
Since most research on similar topics is on firms underlying U.S bankruptcy law, while the 
majority of our sample is subject to Norwegian law, a short review of Norwegian bankruptcy 
proceedings is necessary to highlight important differences. The most notable difference is 
that even though Norwegian legislation since 1984 has had a Chapter 11-like facility, it has 
never achieved its expected popularity (Gisvold, 2012).  
The Debt Negotiation and Bankruptcy Act (DNB Act) of 1984 (Lov om gjeldsforhandling 
og konkurs) and The Creditors Recovery Act of 1984 (Lov om fordringshavernes 
dekningsrett) are the two core documents in Norwegian insolvency and bankruptcy 
legislation. The latter regulates recovery, priority among claims and what assets creditors 
have access to, while the former act covers administration and proceedings for debt 
negotiation and bankruptcy.  
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Figure 3.6 - Progression in Norwegian bankruptcy proceedings 
This figure illustrates the possible sequences in a Norwegian bankruptcy proceeding based 
on the Debt Negotiation and Bankruptcy Act of 1984. After debtor or creditor initiates the 
proceedings, an assessment of the firm is carried out. A voluntary composition is typically 
proposed initially, followed by an attempt for compulsory composition if not successful. The 
court has discretion to skip directly to compulsory proposition or bankruptcy if another 
agreement is unlikely to be reached. 
 
 
 
 
To initiate bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor or creditor must apply to the Probate Court, 
and the firm must be documented as insolvent and insufficient for such proceedings to be 
opened. Debt negotiations can only be initiated by the debtor, and follow three steps. First, 
the firm’s financial situation is assessed and a proposal is prepared. In the second phase, the 
proposed solution is negotiated for a voluntary composition (frivillig gjeldsordning). To be 
approved the proposal must receive full consent among unsecured creditors (DNB Act, §27). 
In the third phase a compulsory composition (tvangsakkord) is negotiated. An arrangement 
in this phase cannot leave creditors will less than 25 percent of face value of their claims, 
and must be approved by 60 or 75 percent of unsecured creditors (DNB Act, §§33 and 43). 
The second phase may be skipped if the court sees it as unlikely to reach an agreement here. 
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The legislation also gives the court discretion to proceed directly to bankruptcy when the 
requirements of compulsory composition are unlikely to be met.  
If an agreement is not reached, or the court has deemed a solution unlikely, the firm proceeds 
to bankruptcy, regulated by the second part of the DNB Act. In this phase all assets are 
confiscated and liquidated to distribute money to the creditors. A creditors committee led by 
a lawyer takes care of the practical aspects of the bankruptcy proceedings. How the funds 
from liquidation are distributed is determined by priority rules, and for unsecured creditors 
the residual funds are distributed based on strict mathematical parity.  
The first part of the DNB Act, regulating voluntary and compulsory debt settlement, was 
built on the same principles as the U.S. Chapter 11 procedures, and was meant to encourage 
more debt forgiveness or moratoriums from creditors to help economically viable firms to 
continue operations. However, this has not become as popular as predicted when the Act was 
signed in 1984 (Gisvold 2012).  According to Gisvold two reasons may explain this. First, 
even though such debt negotiations are supposed to be non-public, the market and general 
public are quickly informed when a firm initiates debt negotiations. This is potentially very 
damaging to the firm. Customers and suppliers may lose faith in them and become reluctant 
to do business with them in the future. The firm also loses more of their strategic 
maneuverability under a public debt renegotiation, and they have to cover charges of 
involving the legal system. Secondly, the court is not given the same flexibility as in the U.S. 
with regards to steering the process towards an acceptable solution for all involved parties. 
This has also contributed to making firms prefer out-of-court negotiations to solve problems 
when possible.  
The number of announced debt negotiations confirms that distressed firms prefer out-of-
court restructurings. All court-supervised debt negotiations, both voluntary and compulsory, 
should be announced through Brønnøysundregisteret. A search shows that between 2005 and 
2011 only 77 debt negotiations were announced, several of them concerning the same 
entities or groups of entities. In addition, close to all of them are small non-public firms. The 
only firm in our sample that has announced a court-supervised (voluntary) debt negotiation 
is Marine Subsea AS.  
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4. Data 
In this section the data gathering process for our analysis is described. This was a two stage 
process. First we identified companies with credit events between 2005 and 2011 according 
to our troubled debt definition. Second we gathered financial accounting data and other firm 
specific data for the companies in our final sample. At the end of this section we also 
describe the statistical methods used in our analyses, and why some common statistical tools 
are inappropriate on our sample.  
4.1 Identifying Companies 
Stamdata is the Norwegian trustee Norsk Tillitsmann’s database and includes virtually all 
bond issues in Norway since 1993. We use this database to define the Norwegian bond 
market and start out with all issued bond tranches registered here. Per March 23rd 2012 this 
included 1,015 companies and 24,837 bond tranches with an aggregated volume of NOK 
6,884 bn. The initial sample is described in the Table 3.1 in the section on the Norwegian 
bond market. 
4.1.1 Filtering process – finding high yield firms 
There are currently no public databases, to our knowledge, that will give us an extensive list 
of companies with credit events. Thus, in order to identify defaults we had to search through 
loan documents for each company individually. To make this job manageable we had to 
funnel out most of the companies from our initial sample without excluding important cases. 
To do this we used different criteria that narrowed our sample down to high yield companies, 
since the likelihood of a credit event occurring in these firms is higher. The final high yield 
sample, covering firms with bonds outstanding in the seven-year period from January 1st 
2005 to December 31st 2011, comprises 268 companies and 786 bond issues. 
The first filter we applied was limiting the time period to bonds maturing after January 2005 
and issued before January 2012. We then excluded companies within industries like banking, 
finance and insurance. Due to regulations these firms cannot be in a financial position where 
they are considered high yield, and the government often guarantees them. Utilities were 
also excluded for the same reason because this is a fairly stable industry without large 
unexpected volatility. Further, companies with an aggregated issued amount of less than 
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NOK 30 million were excluded from the sample. In Brekke and Haugland (2010) a list of 
investment grade companies, compiled by Pareto Securities, was used to identify a high 
yield sample. These investment graded companies were excluded from our sample as well. 
Finally we compared the sample against Pareto Securities High Yield Bond Reports, dated 
July 2011 and January 2012, and added 7 companies with high yield bond issues from 2005 
through 2011 to the sample. 
By using these filters we found 268 companies that we define as our high yield sample. To 
identify the firms involved in a credit event we searched through these firm’s loan 
documents, and came down to 87 companies that either had been liquidated or where some 
sort of amendment to the loan agreement had been made. Six of these firms did not satisfy 
our definition of a troubled debt restructuring, and where thus excluded. The 81 remaining 
firms are all listed in Table 4.1. The sample included 14 companies that has either been 
acquired or changed names. In order to find relevant financial data for these we used the 
name at the time of restructuring. 
Out of this sample of 81 companies we were unable to find relevant annual reports and/or 
loan documents for 5 companies. These where either liquidated or acquired, and had due to 
this typically not completed the annual report for the preceding year. For this reason we 
could not include them in our statistical analysis, and will refer to the remaining 76 
companies as the final sample.  
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Table 4.1 – Final Sample 
The selection of firms included in the analysis organized alphabetically by category. 
	  
Panel	  A:	  Postponement	  of	  Obligations	  
Aker	  Biomarine	  ASA	   Cecon	  ASA	   Norwegian	  Energy	  Company	  
Apptix	  ASA	  	   Fairstar	  Heavy	  Transport	  NV	   Oceanlink	  Ltd	  
Austevoll	  Seafood	  ASA	   Interoil	  E&P	  ASA	   TTS	  Group	  ASA	  
Belships	  ASA	   Marine	  Subsea	  AS	   Domstein	  ASA	  
Bergen	  Group	  ASA	   Master	  Marine	  AS	   Selvaag	  Bolig	  AS	  
Bergen	  Oilfield	  Services	  AS	   Neptune	  Marine	  Invest	  AS	   	  
	   	   	  
Panel	  B:	  Changes	  in	  Capital	  Structure	  
Aladdin	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Company	  	   Handelseiendom	  II	  AS	   RXT	  ASA	  
American	  Shipping	  Company	   Hurtigruten	  ASA	   Rowan	  Drilling	  Norway	  AS	  
Blom	  ASA	   Malka	  Oil	  AB	   Seabird	  Exploration	  PLC	  
Cecon	  ASA	   Marine	  Accurate	  Well	  ASA	   Songa	  Offshore	  SE	  
Codfarmers	  ASA	   Metallkraft	  AS	   Umoe	  Bioenergy	  ASA	  
Crew	  Gold	  Corp	   Nattopharma	  ASA	   Valhalla	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  AS	  
Eitzen	  Chemical	  ASA	   Oceanteam	  Shipping	  ASA	   Valiant	  Petroleum	  Holdings	  AS	  
Eitzen	  Maritime	  Services	  ASA	   Oren	  Oil	  ASA	   Wega	  Mining	  AS	  
Emerging	  Europe	  Land	  	  Develo.	   Peterson	  AS	   Ziebel	  AS	  
Equinox	  Offshore	  Ltd	   Petrolia	  ASA	   	  
Front	  Exploration	  AS	   Proserv	  Group	  AS	   	  
	   	   	  
Panel	  C:	  Sale	  of	  Assets	  
Frontline	  Ltd	   NOR	  Energy	  AS	   Sevan	  Marine	  ASA	  
Krillsea	  Group	  AS	   Norse	  Energy	  Corp.	  ASA	   Transeuro	  Energy	  Corp	  
Nexus	  Floating	  Production	  Ltd	   Rocksource	  ASA	   Wentworth	  Resources	  Limited	  
	   	   	  
Panel	  D:	  Liquidation	  
Ability	  Drilling	  ASA	   Nordic	  Heavy	  Lift	  ASA	   Songa	  Floating	  Production	  ASA	  
Club	  Cruise	  	   Petrojack	  ASA	   Svithoid	  Tankers	  AB	  
Estatia	  Resort	  Property	  AS	   PetroMena	  ASA	   Tandberg	  Data	  ASA	  
FPS	  OCEAN	  AS	   PetroProd	  Ltd	   Tandberg	  Storage	  ASA	  
Monitor	  Oil	  PLC	   Remedial	  Ltd	   Thule	  Drilling	  AS	  
MPF	  Corp	  Ltd	   Scan	  Geophysical	  ASA	   TMG	  International	  AB	  
MPU	  Offshore	  Lift	  ASA	   Seametric	  International	  AS	   Viking	  Drilling	  ASA	  
	   	   	  
Panel	  E:	  Firms	  excluded	  due	  to	  unavailable	  financial	  data	  
Bluestone	  Offshore	  	   EOAL	  Cyprus	  Holdnings	  Limited	   Primorsk	  International	  Shipping	  
Delphin	  Kreuzfahrten	  GmbH	  	   IBB	  Byg	  A/S	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4.2 Final sample 
Of the 268 companies in the high yield sample we identified 81 with credit events by going 
through their loan documents in Stamdata. Even though our final sample is restricted further 
to 76 companies due to data limitations, we will include all 81 in most of the following 
description of the sample. We do this to provide an as complete as possible overview of 
troubled debt firms in the time period covered.  
4.2.1 Categories and Year of Default 
As previously described we split our firms into four categories: Liquidation, Sale of Assets, 
Change in Capital Structure and Postponed Obligations. Table 4.2 shows how our sample is 
spread over these categories in different years. We observe that the most common outcomes 
of financial distress are Change in capital structure and Liquidation. As much as 30 percent 
of the firms with difficulties in handling their debt obligations end up being liquidated, while 
close to 40 percent need a comprehensive restructuring to solve the problems.  There are 
fewer observations where a postponement of obligations has been sufficient and only 10 
cases where sale of assets has been the solution.  
Table 4.2 - Sample Firms by Year and Category 
This table shows the number of firms involved in troubled debt restructurings in the time 
period 2005 to 2011 by category and year of event. We have no observations from 2005. 
	  
Panel	  A:	  All	  81	  firms	  with	  troubled	  debt	  restructurings	  and	  liquidation	  
	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   Sum	  
Liquidation	   0	   1	   9	   11	   1	   2	   24	  
Sale	  of	  Assets	   0	   0	   1	   7	   0	   2	   10	  
Change	  in	  Capital	  Structure	   1	   0	   3	   14	   6	   7	   31	  
Postponed	  Obligations	   0	   3	   2	   9	   2	   0	   16	  
Sum	   1	   4	   15	   41	   9	   11	   81	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Panel	  B:	  The	  final	  sample	  of	  76	  firms	  used	  for	  analysis	  
	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   Sum	  
Liquidation	   0	   1	   9	   9	   1	   0	   20	  
Sale	  of	  Assets	   0	   0	   1	   6	   0	   2	   9	  
Change	  in	  Capital	  Structure	   1	   0	   2	   16	   6	   6	   31	  
Postponed	  Obligations	   0	   3	   2	   9	   2	   0	   16	  
Sum	   1	   4	   13	   40	   9	   9	   76	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Not surprisingly, most cases occurred in 2009, and most of these were directly related to the 
economic downturn at the time. More than 50 percent of all restructurings or liquidations in 
the 7 year period we cover happened this year. There is, however, no substantial difference 
in the relative size of categories this year compared to the period as a whole. We also note 
that there are no observations from 2005 in any category. This gives another indication that 
restricting the covered time period to 2005 is reasonable, since there seems to be barely any 
cases of interest prior to this.  
4.2.2 Industries 
Oil and gas and oil service companies are dominating the final sample, not surprisingly since 
they dominate the Norwegian business and industry landscape in general. The chart in Figure 
4.1 below shows that these firms constitute 60 percent of the issues and 70 percent of the 
volume in our  sample.   
Figure 4.1 - Firms by Industry 
The figure below shows the final sample’s volumes categorized by industry. In combination 
with the table below, we see that the Oil and Gas has the highest volume and number of 
issues while the Oil Service industry has the largest issues (Y-axis in BNOK, table in 
mNOK). 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
(Figures in 
mNOK) 
Oil & 
Gas 
Oil 
Service Shipping Industry 
Telecom
& IT Fishery 
Maritime 
Supply Property Pharma 
Pulp & 
Paper 
Volume 40 818 22 226 9 893 7 781 1 341 3 773 1 135 573 36 385 
# of Issues 100 47 30 21 18 12 6 6 2 1 
Avg. Vol. 408 473 330 371 75 314 189 95 18 385 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
Since the Oil and Gas industry based on the Stamdata categorization is so large relative to 
the others that we decided to separate the Oil and gas category into two separate categories. 
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We define the Oil and Gas category to include only exploration and production companies, 
while the Oil service category includes firms delivering support to E&P companies. 
Additionally, some firms had been categorized erroneously, like the Oil service company 
Proserv Group AS that was found in the Finance industry. All firms that we reclassified for 
these two reasons are listed in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 - Industry reclassification 
The table shows the firms in our sample that has been reclassified from its original industry 
according to Stamdata to more appropriate industry classes. 
	   	   	  
Issuer	   Original	  Industry	   Reclassification	  
Ability	  Drilling	  ASA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Aker	  Biomarine	  ASA	   Industry	   Fishery	  
Aladdin	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Company	  ASA	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
American	  Shipping	  Company	  ASA	   Industry	   Shipping	  
Blom	  ASA	   Service	   Telecom/IT	  
Bluestone	  Offshore	  Pte	  Ltd	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Delphin	  Kreuzfahrten	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Shipping	  
Eitzen	  Maritime	  Services	  ASA	   Wholesale	  and	  Retail	   Maritime	  Supply	  
Equinox	  Offshore	  Accomodation	  Ltd	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
FPS	  OCEAN	  AS	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
Fred	  Olsen	  Energy	  ASA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Ignis	  AS	   Wholesale	  and	  Retail	   Telecom/IT	  
Marine	  Accurate	  Well	  ASA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Marine	  Subsea	  Cyprus	  Holding	  Ltd	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Monitor	  Oil	  PLC	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
MPU	  Offshore	  Lift	  ASA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Nattopharma	  ASA	   Industry	   Pharmaceuticals	  
Neptune	  Marine	  Invest	  AS	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Oceanlink	  Ltd	   Transportation	   Shipping	  
Petrojack	  ASA	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
PetroMena	  ASA	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
PetroRig	  III	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Primorsk	  International	  Shipping	  Ltd	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Shipping	  
Proserv	  Group	  AS	  	   Finance	   Oil	  Service	  
Rocksource	  ASA	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
Scan	  Geophysical	  ASA	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
Seametric	  International	  AS	   Oil	  and	  Gas	   Oil	  Service	  
Umoe	  Bioenergy	  ASA	   Finance	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
Valhalla	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  AS	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
Valiant	  Petroleum	  Holdings	  AS	   Service	   Oil	  and	  Gas	  
	   	   	  
4.2.3 Type of bonds 
We have categorized the type of bonds of our sample firms along two dimensions, seniority 
and time horizon. Seniority is typically described by the three creditor classes senior secured, 
senior unsecured and subordinated debt, in descending order. Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the 
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number of issues and issued amount by seniority of the bonds in our sample. To attain this 
information we had to search through each individual bond’s loan agreement, as seniority is 
not reported in the Stamdata database. We observe that close to half the bond issues in our 
sample are senior secured bonds. 30 percent are issued as senior unsecured, while less than a 
quarter of the issues are subordinated. That secured bonds are dominating this sample is not 
unreasonable. First, since a majority of the firms in our sample are in industries with 
intensive use of tangible assets it is natural for these to provide security for their loans in 
these assets. Second, since most of these were probably perceived as risky at time of issue, 
offering security in assets would reduce the cost of financing. We also note that the average 
issued amount is larger for higher seniority bonds.  
Table 4.4 - Type of bonds 
This table shows the number of issues and issued amount for the bonds of our sample firms 
for different types of bonds. The upper panel categorizes the bonds based on seniority, while 
the lower panel split the bonds between regular bonds, notes and convertible bonds. 
	   	   	   	   	  
Panel	  B:	  Type	  of	  bonds	  by	  seniority	  
Type	   Issues	   %	  of	  total	  
issues	  
Issued	  Amount	  
(mNOK)	  
Avg.	  issued	  
amount	  (mNOK)	  
Senior	  Secured	   113	   46.5	  %	   46	  419	   411	  
Senior	  Unsecured	   73	   30.0	  %	   24	  649	   338	  
Subordinated	   57	   23.5	  %	   16	  893	   296	  
Total	  number	  of	  issues	   243	   	   	   	  
Total	  issued	  amount	  (mNOK)	   	   	   87	  961	   	  
Average	  issued	  amount	  (mNOK)	   	   	   362	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Panel	  B:	  Type	  of	  bonds	  by	  time	  horizon	  
Type	  	   Issues	   %	  of	  total	  
issues	  
Issued	  Amount	  
(mNOK)	  
Avg.	  issued	  
amount	  (mNOK)	  
Bonds	   130	   53.3	  %	   63	  810	   491	  
Notes	   39	   16.0	  %	   7	  655	   196	  
Convertibles	   74	   30.5	  %	   16	  496	   223	  
Total	  number	  of	  tranches	   242	   	   	   	  
Total	  issued	  amount	  (mNOK)	   	   	   87	  961	   	  
Average	  issued	  amount	  (mNOK)	   	   	   362	  
	   	   	   	   	  
In Panel B we look at whether the issued bonds are regular bonds, notes or convertibles. The 
first category is a fairly wide one, and includes bonds with both fixed and floating interest 
rate and zero-coupon bonds. They have in common that they have a time to maturity of more 
than one year. This is also the dominant type of bond, with over 50 percent of the issues. A 
substantial fraction of the bonds have convertible rights, but the issues are on average 
substantially smaller than the bonds without conversion rights. Notes, which are bonds with 
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maturity less than a year, are the least prevalent both in terms of number of issues and issued 
amount.  
4.2.4 Original maturity 
Figure 4.2 below shows that a majority of our sample firms have bonds with original time to 
maturity of five years or shorter. This does not appear to be very different from the rest of 
our high yield sample, as we see from the comparable columns. The total high yield sample 
does have more bonds with original maturity of 10 years or longer, however this constitutes 
a very small fraction of the total issued amount. 
Figure 4.2 - Original Maturity 
This figure shows the original time to maturity at the bond’s issue date for our final sample 
compared with the High Yield sample. We see that there are no noteworthy differences 
between these. 
	   	   	   	   	  
Comparison	  of	  original	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4.3 Financial Accounting Data 
4.3.1 Sources of data 
Our main source of financial accounting data was SNF’s database on accounting and 
enterprise information for Norwegian companies. This database comprises financial 
statements, accounting variables and key information about entities registered in 
Brønnøysundregisteret from 1992 to 2010 (Mjøs and Øksnes, 2012). 
We have restricted ourselves to financials for the two years prior to the credit event. One 
may argue that using averages over three years would be better, like Chatterjee et. al. (1995) 
since it better smoothes out extraordinary gains or losses. However, we use only one to two 
years of data due to two reasons. First, for averages to be meaningful a company must be in a 
fairly stable state where their operations have been established for a while. In our sample 28 
companies were founded less than 4 years before their first credit event, and another 17 
experienced it in their fourth year.  Thus, for many companies we would not even have 
enough data to make a three year average. And since startup companies normally use some 
years to settle their business and start normal operations, using averages will give a 
downward biased picture of a company’s sales, profits and size. Second, the most recent 
values of assets and liabilities give the most accurate picture of the state of the firm when the 
credit event occurs. Some years back the company may have other bonds and liabilities with 
different profiles or another risk profile in general, and using this will blur the data we use in 
our analyses.  
4.3.2 Choice of base year 
Since we use annual financial statement data a precise definition of the base year is 
important. Our variables must consistently reflect the financial and economic situation in our 
firms, without being affected by the restructuring itself. The base year is set to the year the 
credit event took place, and data is collected for the year or two years prior to this. However, 
the diverse nature of the events raises the need for further clarifications. 
When companies are on the verge of financial trouble they often initiate informal discussions 
with bondholders before any formal steps are taken. When such discussions are initiated is 
hard to determine for external parties. Therefore we have chosen to use the date of the first 
letter to bondholders about the event published on Stamdata to determine base year. Gilson 
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et al. (1990) have in a similar way used the first and last reference to the restructuring in the 
Wall Street Journal to define the interval of the restructuring period.   
In some cases the negotiation period before a solution is finally agreed upon draw out and 
may span over several years. Here we use the date of the first announced restructuring 
proposal. If a company has been through several restructurings, we restrict ourselves to look 
at the restructuring that solved the first period of financial distress, in line with previous 
research (Chatterjee et al., 1996). One example is Interoil Exploration and Production ASA. 
They ran into financial trouble during spring 2009, but were not able find a solution before 
summer 2010. Here we use 2009 as base year, since that is when the problems became 
evident.  
4.3.3 Corrections and supplements to the database 
Even though the SNF database is extensive it does lack information on some companies, and 
the quality of the data is not always flawless. In particular, the database was incomplete on 
the variables most important to us, like correct debt categorization. Since having high quality 
data is so important to our analysis due to our limited sample size, we needed to make 
several corrections and supplements to our sample.  
First, since the database only comprises firms incorporated in Norway we lacked data on all 
foreign companies. We registered these manually based on their annual reports, defining the 
variables like the SNF database. The Norwegian companies lacking data were treated the 
same way. In addition, several variables were incomplete, classified incorrectly or very 
inaccurate, especially the debt variables. This forced us to go through all companies’ annual 
reports to quality check the data, and to specify the debt structure in more detail. To the 
extent it was possible we specified the amount of convertible debt, bonds, subordinated 
bonds, bank loans and notes, and split it in its current and non-current portion. Using the 
loan agreements published on Stamdata for all bonds in our sample, the public debt was also 
classified as senior secured, senior unsecured and subordinated. From Stamdata the number 
of outstanding bonds at the time of default was also found.  
The SNF database reports all figures in NOK, but several companies publish their financial 
statements in other currencies. When comparing these we found that the SNF database uses a 
common exchange rate for all firms reporting in the same currency for a given year. In order 
to have consistent data we used this exchange rate when making adjustments and manual 
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registrations. For years and currencies where we not were able to extract an exchange rate 
from the database, we use the year-end closing rate (see appendix for exchange rates). Most 
of the data we collected were used as ratios, hence the choice of exchange rate would not 
matter. The only impact this choice has is on the absolute difference tested for the line items 
sales, total assets, total liabilities and long-term debt. These figures are mostly reported year-
end and hence we choose to use the year-end exchange rate. Accounting principles used for 
foreign currency translation and re-measurements into reporting currency also supports using 
average exchange rates for sales and year-end rates for assets and liabilities (Swieringa, 
2011). 
4.3.4 Industry specific ratios 
Since what is perceived as normal levels of debt, current ratios and trade credits varies 
substantially between different industries, adjusting these for industry averages is necessary 
to avoid finding spurious relations in our analyses. In order to gather data for this we used 
the companies’ NACE Rev. 2 codes to find comparable peers. We gathered data for both 
worldwide and Norwegian averages for the years 2005 through 2011, since the ratios can 
vary according to economic conditions at the time. These were used to adjust the figures of 
each firm for its respective industry and year.  
4.4 Statistical methodology and challenges 
In our analysis we want to test whether there are significant differences between the firms in 
our four categories of financially distressed firms. But as previously noted, analyses of debt 
restructurings in Norway suffer from a small number of observed cases. We have only 
detected 76 cases between 2005 and 2011 with sufficient available accounting data to 
perform analyses on. This raises several challenges in making statistical inferences, as 
necessary assumptions for many common statistical tools are violated and the frequent 
presence of outliers increases the risk of spurious results. Due to this we decided to rely on 
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, as this proved to be the most robust one for our 
purposes. We have also run logistic regressions with few independent variables, which 
qualitatively yielded the same results as the U-tests. But since we should be cautious 
drawing conclusions from the magnitudes of coefficients based on so few observations, the 
logit regressions are not able to tell us much more than the U-tests. Due to this we decided 
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not to report the logit regression results under Findings, though they can be found in the 
Appendix. This section first describes the Mann-Whitney test, before we discuss why other 
statistical tools are inappropriate for our sample.  
4.4.1 The Mann-Whitney U-test 
A common test statistic for analyzing differences between groups is the student’s t-test, 
which tests the difference in means between two groups on a specific variable. However, this 
test requires the populations comprising our categories to follow a normal distribution and 
the compared populations to be independent. This can hardly be said about our sample. The 
violation against the normal distribution assumption is the biggest problem, due to a small 
sample and many extreme observations on various variables.  
Instead of the t-test we use a Mann-Whitney U-test, also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test. This also tests whether one group tends to have larger observation values than another 
group, but as opposed to the t-test it is a non-parametric test. Technically it ranks all values 
of the tested variable from both groups from smallest to largest. It then sums the rank 
numbers of all observations in each group to a rank sum. It tests the following null and 
alternative hypothesis 
 H0: There is no difference between the ranks of the two groups 
 HA: The rank of one pre-specified group is larger than the other 
In our testing we typically have a qualified opinion on which sample will have higher values 
than the other. Based on this we use one-tailed tests, as indicated by the above hypotheses, to 
test whether one pre-specified group has larger observations than the other group or not. 
Preferably we would use a significance level of 5 percent, but due to our fairly small sample 
size this may be hard to achieve. Thus, we will also conclude that there are probable 
differences at 10 percent significance level if there seems to be economical differences 
between the groups.  
For small samples sizes, the decision to keep or reject the null hypothesis is based on a 
calculated U statistic. But for larger samples, this U is approximately normally distributed, 
and by standardizing the U we can use critical values from the normal distribution. With a 
sample size of 20 or larger, preferably with 10 observations in each group, this is expected to 
be approximately true (Keller, 2009). For some of our pairwise comparisons we are close to 
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this lower limit, as we only have 9 observations of firms selling assets. However, unless 
otherwise is stated we will assume our test statistics to be approximately normal distributed 
and consider the normalized z statistic.  
Using the Mann-Whitney test has several advantages for our purposes. Most important, we 
do not need to assume that our samples come from a normally distributed population. Since 
it only considers the rank sum it is also much less sensitive to outliers than a t-test, which 
reduces the risk of finding spurious relations. As we return to under the findings section this 
would have been a major concern to us, as many sample means are skewed substantially by a 
few extreme observations. Some of the determinants we are testing are also ordinal or at 
least not in continuous intervals, like the number of public debt contracts or debt capacity, 
which makes Mann-Whitney the natural choice of test.  
4.4.2 Other statistical tools 
4.4.2.1 OLS regressions 
With a larger sample we would prefer using OLS regressions when comparing our four 
categories. One possibility would be to let the determinant, for example firm size, be the 
dependent variable and create dummy variables for the categories. This would give a model 
similar to this 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑  𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜖   
Here the coefficients are interpreted as how much larger or smaller the firms within each 
category are compared to the base category, which here arbitrarily is set to be the 
Liquidation category. This specification would also enable us to control for other factors by 
adding appropriate independent variables.  
Another approach would be to use linear probability models. Here we could make pairwise 
comparisons of the groups with binary dependent variables, for example by letting 1 denote 
Liquidation and 0 denote Asset sale. When the dependent variable y is binary, it is always 
true that P(y = 1|x) = E(y|x), where x is a vector of the independent variables. In other words, 
the probability of being in the liquidation category given the independent variables equals 
the expected value of the dependent variable given the same independent variables. Then we 
could analyze the outcome’s relations to the determinants through models similar to this 
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𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠+ 𝛽!𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜖   
This is just an example model with arbitrarily chosen independent variables. In such a model 
the coefficients measure the predicted change in probability of being in the Liquidation 
category. 
Both these approaches could provide useful information as we try to understand how the 
categories are distinguished from each other. By appropriate use of multiple independent 
variables we would also be able to comment on the relative importance of different 
determinants. But unfortunately, the small sample size limits the conclusions we are able to 
draw substantially. First, when we include several variables very few of the coefficients are 
likely to be statistically significant, because the model uses too many degrees of freedom 
relative to the sample size. This reduces our ability to control for different factors in our 
models.  
In general, the linear probability model has certain shortcomings. First, it violates the 
homoskedasticity assumption for OLS regressions. With a binary dependent variable there 
must be heteroskedasticity unless the probability does not depend on any of the independent 
variables (Wooldridge, 2009). This does not cause bias, but regular t and F statistics are 
invalid even with large samples in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Additionally, the 
linearity assumption is troublesome outside a certain interval. With linear independent 
variables, the expected probability of outcome may take values below 0 or above 1, which 
does not make sense. As distressed firms often have extreme values for the determinants we 
measure, this could make predictions from such models awkward.  
However, the biggest problem our sample has with OLS regressions is the presence of 
outliers for many of our variables. These outliers, combined with a small sample size, 
introduce a significant risk of finding spurious or overstated relations between our 
determinants and the categories. The reason is that since the OLS method minimizes the sum 
of squared residuals, outliers are given a disproportionately high weight.  
There are several methods available to reduce the problem of outliers. We may simply drop 
the observation completely, but given our already small sample this is not feasible. Another 
option we discussed was winsorization of the variables, which limits all outliers to a 
specified percentile of the data, like 90 percent. Values below the 5th percentile and above 
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the 95th percentile are then adjusted up and down to the cutoff value. This would make our 
OLS regressions more robust to outliers (Wilcox, 2012).  
However, we chose not to do this. The main advantage of using OLS above a non-parametric 
test like Mann-Whitney is that it enables us to say something more about the magnitudes of 
the differences. With small sample sizes one should be extremely cautious in drawing any 
conclusions based on these magnitudes, as the outliers easily can make us overstate or 
understate the true values. Winsorising the data could reduce some of the problem, but at the 
same time it reduces the variance of the sample. And even after doing this, we should be 
careful using the regression results for more than qualitative purposes.  
Based on these arguments the OLS regressions are not able to tell much more than the 
Mann-Whitney test with a sample like ours, and are then just less robust ways of drawing the 
same conclusions as the Mann-Whitney tests. Due to this we decided not to report any 
results from such regressions, except noting that the results are in line with those from the 
Mann-Whitney tests.  
4.4.2.2 Logistic regressions 
Logistic regressions are used in the same situations as linear probability models, where we 
want to analyze the probability of different outcomes. The advantage is that they avoid many 
of the problems linear probability models face, as described above. We will not elaborate on 
the mathematical specifications of logistic regression models here, but they account both for 
the heteroskedasticity problem and ensure that predicted values are strictly between 1 and 0 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Using a logistic distribution would also reduce the sensitivity towards 
outliers, as this distribution has heavier tails than the normal distribution, and make our 
models more robust. Additionally, by using multinomial logistic models we are able to 
compare more than two groups simultaneously something that would be useful for our 
purposes.  
Since logistic regression models solve many of the issues OLS models face, it may be used 
for analyzing our sample. But the sample size is still small, thus we should not interpret the 
coefficients from these regressions too literally. Since we do not feel confident trusting more 
than the qualitative implications of the regressions, they are not able to enhance our 
understanding more than our simple Mann-Whitney tests. Even though logit models are 
more robust to outliers than OLS models, they are still less robust than non-parametric tests 
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for a sample like ours. Based on this we decided to rely mostly on the Mann-Whitney tests, 
and rather use the logit regressions to back up the conclusions.  
4.4.2.3 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient measures the statistical dependency between two 
variables. The coefficient is calculated in the same manner as the more often used Pearson 
correlation coefficient, but instead of using the absolute values it measures the correlation 
between the ranked values. In other words it is a non-parametric tool like the Mann-Whitney 
test (Keller, 2009).  
Using this would avoid the problems of outliers that OLS regressions suffer from, and still 
reveal something about the relative dependency of various determinants and outcome. 
Unfortunately our categories are categorical and not ordinal, hence they cannot be ranked in 
a meaningful way. This implies that a Spearman correlation must be calculated for two and 
two categories, where the outcome variable would be binary. However, this is basically the 
same as performing a Mann-Whitney test on two outcome categories, and would not give us 
much more than we know from these tests. Due to this we see no further benefits from 
computing the Spearman rank correlation coefficients.  
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5. Findings 
In this section we test the significance of our proposed determinants from the theory section. 
When analyzing these determinants we want to test whether there are significant differences 
for the variables between our four categories. Due to the small sample size and extreme 
observations such analyses are challenging, and we must be cautious when interpreting the 
results. Based on this we rely heavily on the Mann-Whitney U-test, as it is the most robust 
for our purposes. This allows us to make pairwise comparisons between our four categories 
without worrying that our results are biased by individual observations of extreme 
magnitude. Simple logistic regressions are also used, but as they draw similar conclusions, 
their results are reported in the Appendix.  
The determinants will be analyzed individually in the same order that they were categorized 
in the theory section, before we explore further whether firms with access to bank financing 
behave differently than firms in general for any determinants. Finally we discuss the 
robustness of our findings, implications of dealing with a small sample and potential biases.  
5.1 Determinants of outcome 
5.1.1 Degree of Economic Distress 
As many other empirical studies have done, we use a firm’s past financial performance to 
measure the degree of economic distress. From a theoretical perspective we expected 
restructured firms to show better financial performance leading up to the distressed period 
than those liquidated. The firms with more comprehensive restructurings should also 
perform poorer than firms that only postpone their obligations.  
To measure financial performance we use EBITDA ratios to sales and total assets. Tests 
have been performed both with data from the year prior the credit event and with average 
figures over the past two years. As discussed in the data section there are arguments for 
using both of these measures. The most recent financial statement should normally give the 
most accurate picture of the state of the firm. But extraordinary gains or losses, that are 
particularly common among distressed firms, may give biased results for a firm’s underlying 
operations. Averages over several years would smooth out such events and also better reflect 
long term trends in profitability, but since our sample includes a large number of very young 
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firms we have restricted ourselves to a two year average in order to not lose too many 
observations.  
Figure 5.1 - Distribution of performance measures 
This figure illustrates the financial performance of our sample firms by restructuring outcome. The 
left chart shows EBITDA to Sales ratios and how many firms in each outcome category with ratios 
below negative 100 percent, between 0 and negative 100 percent or above 0. The right chart shows 
the number of firms with EBITDA to Total Asset ratios below negative 10 percent, between 0 and 
negative 10 percent and above 0.  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
As Figure 5.1 shows, our firms generally show poor financial performance. Within all 
classes except Postponed Obligations, there is a majority of firms with negative EBITDA 
ratios, as expected from financially distressed firms. Average ratios are not meaningful to 
discuss here, because a few firms pull the figures down excessively. These have typically not 
fully established their operations, such that their expenditures heavily outweigh their modest 
income. This yields extreme EBITDA to sales ratios, like Discover Petroleum’s -32,543 
percent, and computing sample averages including these will not give a proper picture of the 
situation.  
Medians give a better picture and as we see in Table 5.1, Postponed obligation is the only 
category with positive median ratios. An interesting observation is that Liquidation has the 
lowest median ratio to sales, but when we look at EBITDA to total asset the median value of 
this category is better than both Sale of assets and Changes in capital structure. One possible 
explanation can be that firms soon to be liquidated have written down more assets than other 
firms, which will improve this ratio.  
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Table 5.1 - Degree of Economic Distress and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares measures of the degree of economic distress for firms in our four 
categories. Economic distress is measured as the EBITDA ratio to total sales and total 
assets one year and averages over two years prior to the event. Panel A shows median and 
mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
Year prior to default 
  EBITDA / Sales -1.94 (-41.78) -0.42 (-53.01) 0.02 (-2.85) -0.94 (-6.96) 
EBITDA / TA -0.12 (-0.11) -0.09 (-0.32) 0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (-0.12) 
2 Year Averages 
  EBITDA/ Sales -1.00 (-30.91) -0.28 (-21.45) 0.02 (-3.97) -1.26 (-15.10) 
EBITDA / TA -0.07 (-0.10) -0.08 (-0.16) 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (-0.10) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset sales 
vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
Year prior to default 
    EBITDA / Sales 0.106 -0.153 -1.621* -0.124 -0.802 -1.683** 
 # Observations 15 vs. 7 15 vs. 28 15 vs. 16 7 vs. 28 7 vs. 16 28 vs. 16 
EBITDA / TA -0.094 1.350 -2.133** 0.599 -1.359* -2.919*** 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
2 Year Averages 
    
EBITDA/ Sales -0.540 -0.866 -1.756** -0.206 -0.952 -1.300* 
 # Observations 17 vs. 9 17 vs. 28 17 vs. 16 9 vs. 28 9 vs. 16 28 vs. 16 
EBITDA / TA 0.094 0.772 -1.867** 0.502 -1.461* -2.613*** 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
As we already have indicated, the category Postponed Obligations stands out from the other 
three. These firms have significantly higher EBITDA ratios to assets than the rest, and 
towards firms reorganizing the capital structure the difference is significant at a 99 percent 
confidence level. The results are similar for EBITDA to sales figures, but here the difference 
towards asset selling firms does not reach a significant level.  
Between the categories Liquidation, Sale of Assets and Changes in capital structure there are 
no significant differences in financial performance. Liquidation cases have relatively more 
cases of very bad performance when we measure EBITDA to sales, where close to 60 
percent have negative ratios larger than 100 percent. This trend is not present when looking 
at the ratio to total assets. Here the firms altering the capital structure are relatively more 
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present among the worst performing ones. As mentioned above, this may be caused by larger 
write-downs among liquidation cases, which result in a decreased denominator. These 
tendencies are anyway far from statistically significant on any level.  
Hence, our analysis shows that in our sample, firms that only have to make minor 
amendments to resolve the distressed situation perform significantly better prior to the credit 
event than firms that liquidate or undertake larger restructurings. This is in line with what we 
expected, and makes intuitive sense. When a minor amendment is sufficient it is unlikely 
that the firm is in severe trouble. Such firms instead have decently sound underlying 
operations, and the problems are more temporary due to constraints in the credit market or 
delays in project deliveries. Since the financial performance of the firms work as a proxy for 
their economic viability, these firms exhibit stronger results than the ones with more severe 
problems.  
From an economic theory perspective, we also expected the liquidated firms to perform 
worse than those restructuring through an asset sale or capital structure change, as the latter 
two groups should show more economic viability. The failure of finding such a relation 
lends support to Asquith, Gertner and Sharfstein (1994), who were not able to find any 
relation between performance and successful resolution of distress either. This implies that 
when a firm first has run into serious financial distress, their past performance cannot help 
predict whether they will be liquidated or manage to restructure successfully.  
This last result would suggest that financial performance is not a good determinant of the 
outcome of a distressed situation. However, most firms heading into financial distress first 
attempt to solve the problem with an extension of maturity or delayed interest payment, 
perhaps hoping that the problems are only temporary. In many cases there are given several 
extensions of maturity before the firm finally acknowledges that a more comprehensive 
restructuring is necessary. Our results suggest that when a firm first announces a proposal of 
delayed payments, their past performance can be an important determinant to whether this is 
sufficient or if the firm later needs a larger restructuring. If their financial performance is not 
too bad, a small amendment is likely to be enough, while if the firm has performed badly, 
especially over time, a comprehensive restructuring or liquidation is a more probable 
outcome.  
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This is of particular interest to investors in the firm, both those holding debt and equity. A 
larger restructuring is far more costly, both in terms of direct and indirect costs. The direct 
costs, like legal fees or costs for paying consultants helping with the restructuring proposals, 
will increase with the complexity of the restructuring. The indirect costs may be even bigger. 
These are costs related to restricted strategic maneuverability during the restructuring period 
and deteriorated reputation among customers, suppliers and others. The longer the 
restructuring period, the higher these costs will typically be. If an investor could predict 
whether such a restructuring is necessary, he would rather exit now than risking a lower 
recovery rate later. Conversely, if an investor observes a firm with distressed securities due 
to a proposed payment delay but with decent underlying operations, he may buy it at a 
discount now and receive full recovery when the temporary troubles are resolved.  
To summarize, the firms that are able to resolve their financial problems through smaller 
amendments, like postponing obligations, perform significantly better prior to the credit 
event than other financially distressed firms. When a firm already is in deep financial 
trouble, there is no significant difference between the firms liquidating and those 
undertaking asset or debt restructurings.  
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5.1.2 Creditor Coordination Problems 
From theory we know that coordination problems among creditors should be important 
determinants of how financial distress is resolved. These problems may appear at several 
levels within a firm, and below we present findings on measures for many of these.  
5.1.2.1 The level of trade credit 
Trade creditors are known to be a difficult group to negotiate with due to their dispersed and 
unsophisticated nature. This should imply that firms with high levels of trade credit are, 
more often, forced to liquidate or sell assets. Chatterjee et al. (1996) confirmed this by 
finding significantly higher levels of trade credit among firms filing for Chapter 11 than 
those restructuring out of court.  
We, however, fail to find any such relation among our categories. Table 5.2 shows the level 
of trade credit to total assets and corresponding z-statistics from the pairwise Mann-Whitney 
U-tests. There is in fact a weak tendency that liquidated firms have less trade credit than 
others, as the median liquidated firm has the lowest trade credit to total assets at 4.3 percent. 
Also after we control for industry differences by subtracting the industry average ratio for 
each firm, we find no significant differences between our categories. As the median and 
mean values in Panel A shows, there is virtually no difference from the industry average in 
any category. There are no obvious reasons why trade creditors in Norway should behave 
differently than those in the U.S., and be better organized or more forgiving. The overall 
level of trade credit among firms in our sample is not notably different from the U.S. firms in 
Chatterjee et al.’s (1996) sample, so it is not because they are less important creditors.  
The reason why we do not find significant differences in trade credits may be found in our 
categorization of firms and differences in the institutional framework. Chatterjee et al. 
(1996) find significant differences between Chapter 11 and out-of-court restructuring cases, 
but equivalents to Chapter 11 are close to non-existent among firms in the Norwegian bond 
market. As mentioned earlier this is why such a categorization of our sample is impossible. 
A direct comparison between Chapter 11 cases and liquidation cannot be made either, since 
many Chapter 11 cases successfully restructure under formal procedures and continue 
operations.  
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Table 5.2  - The Level of Trade Credit and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares measures of the level of trade credits for firms in our four categories. 
We use the ratio of trade credit to total assets from the firms’ financial statements one year 
prior to the credit event. The adjusted trade credit to total assets ratio is found by subtracting 
the industry average ratio for each firm.  Panel A shows median and mean values, while 
Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.  
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
   Trade Credit / TA 0.07 (0.09) -0.42 (-53.01) 0.02 (-2.85) -0.94 (-6.96) 
Adj. Trade / TA 0.009 (0.026) 0.014 (0.012) -0.004 (0.010) 0.000 (0.003) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation vs. 
Sale of assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
 
    
Trade Credit / TA 0.106 -0.153 -1.621* -0.124 -0.802 -1.683** 
Adj. Trade / TA 0.000 -0.444 -0.800 -0.211 -0.507 -0.410 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
Since debt negotiation under court administration is so seldom in Norway, larger and more 
senior creditors are left with two options. First, they may force the firm to liquidate and 
collect what they are entitled to according to their seniority, but if the firm and/or industry 
are in distress they risk ending up with only a fraction of their original claims. The other 
option is to accept some type of restructuring or renegotiation where they perhaps must 
forgive some claims, but in total recover more. Even though these creditors must carry a 
majority of the restructuring costs, a premature liquidation may be even more costly, and the 
level of trade credit does not seem to be high enough to affect this decision.  
5.1.2.2 The level of bank debt 
Previous research has found evidence both for and against a positive relation between the 
level of bank debt and successful debt restructuring. As Table 5.3 shows, our first test seems 
to support Gilson et al.’s (1990) results, that the firms with high levels of bank debt are more 
likely to resolve their problems successfully. The Mann-Whitney test indicates lower levels 
of bank debt among liquidated firms than all other groups. However, the only significant 
difference is between Liquidation and Postponed obligations, and only on a 90 percent 
confidence level. The weak significance may be due to the small sample size. 
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Table 5.3 - The Level of Band Debt and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares measures of the level of bank debt for firms in our four categories. As bank debt 
we have included all short and long term debt to credit institutions reported in the financial 
statements one year prior to the credit event. The first measure includes all firms in our sample, 
while the second includes only firms with some bank debt. Both are ratios to total debt. The bank 
dummy variable takes the value 1 if a firm has bank debt and 0 when it has no bank debt in the 
capital structure. Panel A shows median and mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from 
pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Bank debt relative to Total Debt. Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
Year prior to default 
  Bank Debt / Debt 0,08 (0,16) 0,08 (0,22) 0,11 (0,25) 0,00 (0,18) 
Bank (>0) / Debt  0,36 (0,30) 0,25 (0,31) 0,26 (0,31) 0,33 (0,40) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
Year prior to default 
    Bank Debt / Debt -0.426 -1.264 -1.526* -0.676 -1.087 -0.645 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
Bank (>0) / Debt  0.200 0.740 0.768 0.062 -0.049 -0.102 
 # Observations 9 vs. 5 9 vs. 22 9 vs. 13 5 vs. 2 5 vs. 13 22 vs. 13 
Bank Debt Dummy -0.517 -1.836** -2.186** 0.858 -1.346* -0.758 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
If we just consider the overall statistical test for all firms it would seem like banks less often 
let firms go bankrupt, and are more willing to facilitate continued operations than other 
creditors. However, a closer examination of the underlying figures raises questions about 
this. As Panel A shows, the median firm among the liquidation cases does not have any bank 
debt at all, while the average value is almost in the same range as for the other three 
categories. We also find that while 81 percent of the Postponed obligation firms have some 
bank financing, only 45 percent of the liquidated firms do. For the Asset sale and Change in 
capital structure categories the figures are 56 and 71 percent, respectively. This suggests that 
within the groups there seems to be a distinction between those with bank debt and those 
without.  
If the firms with bank debt are different from those without, for example by being higher 
quality firms, we are likely to suffer from a self-selection bias. Firms with bank debt handle 
financial distress better because they are better firms in general, not because they have bank 
 62 
debt. A common technique for correcting selection biases is to use the Heckman correction 
method. The two step approach of the method uses an instrumental variable to correct for the 
selection bias, similar to a two-step least squares regression (Kennedy, 2003). To make such 
a correction here we must have an instrumental variable that is correlated with whether a 
firm has bank debt or not, but uncorrelated with the outcome. To find such a variable proved 
difficult, as most firm specific characteristics related to the use of bank debt also have some 
impact on outcome. Due to this and the general shortcomings of OLS regressions described 
in the Data section, we chose not to use the Heckman correction method.  
An alternative is to only consider the firms with bank financing as a way of isolating the 
effect of bank debt in a negotiation process. When we exclude the firms without bank 
financing, we see that liquidation firms on average have 40 percent bank debt to total debt, 
while the three restructuring categories only have averages about 30 percent. We are not able 
to confirm a significant difference between the groups with a Mann-Whitney test, but the 
failure of doing so is largely due to the very small samples we are left with when excluding 
firms without bank debt.  
We also construct a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the firm has some bank debt in 
its capital structure and 0 when it uses no bank debt. A Mann-Whitney test of this variable 
will indicate if there are relatively more firms with bank debt in one or the other category. 
From Table 5.3 we observe that in the Liquidation category there are significantly fewer 
firms with access to bank debt than in our debt restructuring categories. Towards the Asset 
sale category there is no significant difference.  
One should be careful when interpreting these figures with so few observations, especially in 
our second test. But there may be two possible lessons we can learn from this. First, since 
fewer firms among the liquidated have access to bank financing, the presence or absence of 
bank debt seems to indicate the quality of the firm. Better firms are given bank debt, and 
because they are better they less are less often liquidated. This finding also indicates that 
banks are doing a decent job managing risk, as they often stay clear of the most severe cases.  
Second, when we only look at firms in financial distress where banks are involved, we saw 
that bank debt on average constitute a larger part of total debt in liquidated firms. Even 
though our sample is too small to confirm that this difference is significant, the tendency is 
clear. If this is true also for larger samples or the population, the level of bank debt will be 
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negatively correlated with the probability of a successful restructuring.  This would support 
Asquith et al.’s (1994) results that banks rarely provide debt forgiveness. Chatterjee et al. 
(1996) made similar findings, indicating that firms filing for Chapter 11 had significantly 
higher levels of bank debt than those restructuring out of court. This is an economically 
appealing result. Since banks typically hold secured claims, they will be treated better in 
liquidation than unsecured claimants. Due to this, banks’ expected recovery value from 
liquidation should be higher than from restructuring in more cases than it would be for an 
unsecured creditor.  
To summarize, the strongest determinant of outcome is whether the firm has access to bank 
financing or not, the relative size is less important. Still, if a distressed firm has bank debt it 
is more likely to be liquidated the bigger portion bank debt constitutes of the total debt.  
5.1.2.3 The level of Public Debt 
Since public debt is designed such that it may be held more dispersed than private debt, the 
creditor coordination problem should increase the larger fraction of a firm’s debt that is 
public. We define public debt as the bonds not specifically deemed private in our sample 
firms’ financial statements. Virtually all of these issues are also registered in the Stamdata 
database.  
Table 5.4 shows the median and average value of public debt to total liabilities. We observe 
that liquidation cases have most public debt among the categories, with a median ratio of 68 
percent. While the Sale of assets and Change in capital structure categories are about the 
same at 58 and 59 percent, respectively, the median value of postponed obligations is only 
33 percent. Below the median and average figures we have the results for the pairwise 
Mann-Whitney tests. These show that firms postponing obligations have significantly less 
public debt than both liquidated and asset selling firms. Compared to firms that liquidate, the 
difference is significant up to a 98 percent confidence level, while the latter is significant at 
90 percent. We also find significantly lower levels of public debt among firms reorganizing 
the capital structure than liquidation cases at 90 percent confidence level.  
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Table 5.4 - The Level of Public Debt and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares the level of public debt for firms in our four categories. As public debt we use 
the outstanding amount of bonds and certificates in the financial statement one year prior to the 
credit event as a ratio to total debt. The number of public contracts is a firm’s number of outstanding 
bonds at time of the credit event, found in the Stamdata database. Panel A shows median and mean 
values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
  
  
Public / Tot. Debt 0.58 (0.57) 0.59 (0.51) 0.33 (0.42) 0.68 (0.62) 
# public contracts 1.00 (1.89) 1.00 (2.00) 1.00 (1.56) 2.00 (2.00) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
  
    
Public / LTD 0.424 1.389* 2.101** 0.405 1.529* 0.965 
# public contracts 0.988 0.981 1.399* -0.165 0.000 0.330 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
Another proxy of the number of creditors, used by for example Chatterjee et al. (1996), is the 
number of public debt contracts. Our analysis of this is based on the number of outstanding 
bonds registered in Stamdata at the time of the credit event. Table 5.4 also shows medians, 
averages and test statistics for this variable. One may question whether using this variable is 
suitable for the Norwegian bond market. Since most firms are relatively small, the majority 
of our sample firms only have one outstanding bond. Still, we see the tendency that 
liquidated firms have more debt contracts than the other categories, and towards Postponed 
obligations this difference is significant at a 90 percent confidence level.  
These results support our hypothesis that firms with widely held debt more often are forced 
to liquidate or sell assets. Creditors even within the same creditor class may have different 
risk profiles for their portfolios, and thus prefer different solutions. When a firm has several 
debt contracts and higher outstanding amounts of debt it is reasonable to expect that the 
holders of this debt are more numerous and with more divergent interests. This increases the 
potential coordination problem and the difficulty of finding a solution all creditors can agree 
on. Thus, we can conclude that high levels of public debt tend to complicate the negotiation 
to resolve financial distress, and result in more liquidation of firms or selling of assets.  
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5.1.2.4 Seniority and different creditor classes 
We concluded above that firms with high levels of public debt seem to have bigger problems 
coordinating their creditors in a restructuring process, which may result in premature 
liquidations and asset sales. But by examining the public debt compositions closer we should 
be able to be more accurate in predicting the outcome of financial distress. As discussed in 
the theory section, creditors with senior and secured claims will more often prefer 
liquidation, while more subordinate creditors know that liquidation in many cases will leave 
them with nothing. Instead they rather prefer forgiving some of their claims, hoping for an 
improved recovery over time. Knowing this, the seniority of the dominant creditor class 
should be an important determinant of outcome.  
We have split up the public debt in three categories, senior secured, senior unsecured and 
subordinated debt. The classification is based on the original loan documents of each bond. 
Further we have carved out the portion of the debt that is convertible, a category that 
comprises both secured convertible bonds and subordinated convertible bonds.  
In Table 5.5 we find figures for these variables relative to total liabilities. Medians are not 
meaningful to discuss here, because since a majority of firms only have one outstanding 
bond two out of three creditor classes will have a zero value for these observations. Averages 
are more appropriate, and tell us that all firms in general have more senior secured bonds 
than unsecured bonds. This is not surprising, as investors are more willing to lend money to 
high-risk firms when their loans are collateralized. However, Liquidation and Sale of asset 
firms on average have more senior secured bonds, both as a portion of total liabilities and 
relative to the unsecured creditor classes. Liquidation cases have the largest average ratio at 
42 percent, while asset-selling firms on average have 35 percent senior secured bonds. The 
last two categories are down at 23 and 26 percent. When it comes to the two unsecured 
creditor classes the categories are more similar, with averages between 10 and 15 percent for 
each. But this implies that sale of asset and liquidated firms relatively have less unsecured 
bonds.  
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Table 5.5 - Creditor Classes and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares the relative size of different creditor classes for firms in our four categories. 
Using loan documents published on Stamdata the bonds have been categorized as senior secured, 
senior unsecured or subordinated. Convertibles are found in all three categories. All measures are 
ratios to total debt. Panel A shows median and mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from 
pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  
Sale of 
assets 
Changes in 
capital 
structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
  
  
Senior Secured / Total Debt 0 (0.35) 0 (0.23) 0 (0.26) 0 (0.42) 
Senior Unsecured / Total Debt 0 (0.11) 0 (0.13) 0 (0.04) 0 (0.10) 
Subordinated / Total Debt 0 (0.11) 0 (0.15) 0 (0.12) 0 (0.10) 
Convertible / Total Debt 0 (0.29) 0 (0.17) 0 (0.08) 0 (0.09) 
          
    
     Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation
vs. Asset 
sale 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
  
Senior Secured / 
Total Debt 0.409 1.802** 1.362* 1.114 0.790 -0.430 
Senior Unsecured / 
Total Debt -0.776 -0.908 0.060 0.073 0.758 0.979 
Subordinated / Total 
Debt 0.604 -0.256 -0.111 -0.412 -0.683 0.077 
Convertible /  
Total Debt -2.183** -0.679 -0.199 1.714** 2.012** 0.399 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
       
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
These indicated differences are confirmed by statistical tests. The z-statistics from the Mann-
Whitney tests reported in Table 5.5 show that liquidated firms have significantly higher 
levels of senior secured bonds than firms altering capital structure and postponing 
obligations. The differences are significant at 95 and 90 percent confidence level, 
respectively. Sale of asset firms also show tendencies of having more secured bonds, but 
these differences do not reach significant levels.  
The results confirm our hypothesis that financially distressed firms with more senior secured 
bonds more often end up being liquidated than firms with more unsecured bonds. This is not 
surprising from a theoretical perspective. Secured bondholders have incentives to push for 
liquidation or asset sales, since they are guaranteed to have priority on the proceeds of the 
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liquidated assets. Unsecured bondholders on the other hand have more to lose on premature 
restructuring.  
What is interesting here is that some practitioners in the Norwegian high yield bond market 
have previously claimed that the sense of solidarity and collaboration across creditor classes 
is stronger than one would expect (Brekke and Haugland, 2010). If this was true we would 
see a weaker relation between different risk classes and the outcome of financial distress in 
Norway than has been found in studies of the U.S. bond market. However, according to our 
findings we have no clear evidence to support this claim. In a similar analysis in Chatterjee 
et al. (1996), they found most of the debt contracts among Chapter 11 firms to be senior, 
while the majority of debt contracts in firms restructuring out of court were junior.  
Since we found all our categories to have relatively more secured than subordinated debt, 
also in the debt restructuring categories, one could argue that the claim is correct and that 
secured bondholders indeed show more solidarity in debt restructuring cases even when they 
are the largest public creditor class. However, this may also be attributed to differences 
between the Norwegian and U.S. high yield bond markets. The U.S. market is much more 
mature and liquid, and bonds are traded much more frequently. As compensation for low 
liquidity, the bondholders may be given security in assets in order to reduce the cost of 
financing for the firm. Hence, the fact that liquidation, asset restructuring and debt 
restructuring cases all have more senior secured bonds may simply be because investors in 
the Norwegian market generally prefer secured bonds, and that unsecured bonds become too 
expensive for the firms to issue.  
An interesting observation in our analysis is regarding the amount of convertible debt. As 
Table 5.5 shows, the firms restructuring through asset sales have significantly more 
convertible debt than all other categories. Compared to postponed obligations and liquidation 
cases the difference is significant at a 2.5 percent significance level, while towards capital 
structure changes it is significant at a 5 percent level. When studying the underlying data we 
see that 7 out of 9 asset selling firms had convertible bonds, while a majority of firms in the 
other three categories did not have any. This could explain some of the large differences in 
average level of convertible debt, but among the firms with such debt the tendency is similar. 
If we compute the average after excluding firms without convertible debt, Changes in capital 
structure firms is slightly higher at 40 percent of total debt with asset selling firms come in at 
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37 percent. The two remaining categories are still far behind, at 18 percent for firms 
postponing obligations and 25 percent for liquidated firms.  
There are no obvious reasons for this result. Among the convertible bonds there are both 
senior secured and subordinated in all categories without any overweight of either in any 
category. If the convertibles in the asset restructuring class were secured by the specific 
assets that were sold it could explain some of the difference, but there are no indications of 
this. Since we cannot find any economically intuitive reason why high levels of convertible 
debt should increase the probability of asset restructuring, we suspect it to be a spurious 
result due to the small sample size for asset restructurings.  
5.1.3 Liquidity 
Based on theory and previous research we hypothesized that firms with low debt capacity are 
often forced to sell assets. To analyze this we measure the firms’ current ratios and Pulvino’s 
debt capacity measure, as described in the Theory section. Since what is perceived as a 
normal balance sheet structure varies between different industries, we have also controlled 
for this by subtracting the industry average for each firm. The industry ratios are found using 
averages from international peers corresponding to the fiscal year prior to the credit event.  
The upper panel of Table 5.6 shows medians and averages for the four categories. The 
median current ratios of all categories are below or just above 1. A rule of thumb is that a 
current ratio between 1 and 1.5 is satisfactory, above 1.5 is good, below 1 is weak and below 
0.5 is not satisfactory. The medians of our categories are all in the weak area, where those 
postponing obligations are just above one. This is not surprising, since all are in financial 
distress and have trouble handling their obligations. The average figures are not as 
appropriate to the discussion, because some extreme observations pull the average up 
disproportionately. One example is Remedial (Cyprus) Plc, with a current ratio of more than 
36.  
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Table 5.6 - Liquidity and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares measures of liquidity for firms in our four categories. The current ratio is 
defined as the ratio between current assets and current liabilities. The adjusted ratio is found by 
subtracting the industry average ratio for each firm. Low debt capacity is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 when the current ratio is below and the debt to total asset ratio is above industry average.  
Panel A shows median and mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-
Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
  
  
Current Ratio 0.67 (1.17) 0.84 (2.09) 1.07 (1.35) 0.86 (3.44) 
Adj. Current Ratio -3.46 (-3.00) -3.41 (-2.14) -2.87 (-2.71) -2.62 (-0.71) 
          
    
     Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
  
    
Current Ratio 0.754 0.039 -0.255 -0.761 -0.793 -0.449 
Adj. Current Ratio 0.801 0.463 0.032 -0.632 -1.019 -0.359 
Low Debt Capacity -0.839 0.130 0.410 0.959 1.109 -0.447 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
When we adjust the current ratios by industry averages we see that all categories have 
substantially negative ratios. The interpretation of this is that most firms have current ratios 
well below what is normal in their respective industries, again not surprising given their 
distressed situation.  
When we compare the current ratios in the different categories, we find no significant 
differences between any of them, though there is a slight tendency that asset selling firms 
have lower current ratios than firms in the other three categories. The tendency strengthens 
when we control for industry variations, and at the most the difference between asset selling 
and obligation postponing firms is significant at about 15 percent. This is however far from 
enough to support our hypothesis that firms with low current ratios more often end up selling 
assets to resolve their problems.  
Another way to test the liquidity is to use Pulvino’s measure of debt capacity. We have 
performed a similar test, where we have assigned the dummy value 1 to firms with both 
current ratio below and debt level above industry average, and 0 if not. The value 1 will then 
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indicate a firm with low debt capacity. At the bottom of Table 5.6 test statistics from the 
pairwise comparisons on this measure is reported. The results are similar to those we found 
when testing the current ratio alone. In the category Sale of assets, there seem to be more 
firms with low debt capacity than in the categories Liquidation, Change of capital structure 
and Postponed Obligations. The differences are however not significant here between any of 
the categories.  
Hence, we have no significant evidence to support the findings of Kruse (2002) that firms 
with low debt capacity more often sell assets to resolve their financial problems. We also 
suspected liquidated firms to have lower debt capacity than debt restructuring firms, but 
there are no signs of this. This indicates that a firm’s debt capacity in itself cannot predict the 
outcome of a restructuring process. The reason is probably that other factors are more 
important in determining the outcome. 
5.1.4 Leverage 
From the theory section we expected to find higher leverage among firms implementing 
more comprehensive restructurings. To test this we first compare the debt to capital ratio of 
firms in the different categories, before we compare the level of interest expenses.  
5.1.4.1 Debt Ratios 
Table 5.7 shows average and median figures for total debt and long-term debt to total assets. 
For total debt we have also controlled for industry differences as we did for the current 
ratios. The adjusted figures presented in the table represent debt ratios after subtracting the 
industry average ratio for each firm the corresponding year. Figures above zero indicate debt 
ratios above the industry average, and opposite for negative figures. In magnitude it can be 
interpreted as percentage points above or below industry average.  
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Table 5.7 - Leverage and Restructuring Outcomes 
This table compares measures of leverage for firms in our four categories. Figures for total 
liabilities, long-term debt and total assets are all found in the financial statements one year prior to 
the credit event. The adjusted debt ratio is found by subtracting the industry average ratio from the 
total liabilities to total assets ratio. Panel A shows median and mean values, while Panel B shows Z-
statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.  
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital 
structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
  
  
Total Liabilities / Total Assets 0.71 (0.80) 0.79 (0.87) 0.77 (0.74) 0.67 (0.77) 
Adjusted Debt Ratio 0.17 (0.26) 0.25 (0.38) 0.21 (0.24) 0.23 (0.29) 
Long-Term Debt / Total 
Assets 0.48 (0.41) 0.36 (0.42) 0.37 (0.38) 0.44 (0.40) 
          
    
     Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
  
    Total Liabilities / 
Total Assets -0.660 -0.270 -0.032 -0.233 0.396 0.359 
Adjusted Debt Ratio 0.172 0.221 0.462 -0.052 0.089 -0.012 
Long-Term Debt  / 
Total Assets -0.236 0.531 0.032 0.632 0.453 -0.180 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
We observe that both median and average figures of total debt to assets for all categories are 
very high. The histogram in Figure 5.2 shows that the majority of firms in all categories have 
debt ratios between 50 and 90 percent, and there are also quite a lot of firms with debt ratios 
above both 90 and 100 percent. When the debt ratio exceeds 100 percent, the firm has 
negative equity.  For more than 80 percent of the firms within each category the debt ratio 
exceed the industry average. This is not surprising, since firms in financial distress are 
typically characterized by having more debt than they are able to handle, either temporarily 
or more fundamentally. 
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Figure 5.2 - Distribution of debt to capital ratios 
This figure illustrates number of firms in each category with debt to capital ratios in the given 
ranges. Firms with ratios above 100 percent have negative equity value.   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
What we are interested in is differences between the four different categories, but the 
histogram indicates that they are spread out relatively even across the groups. Mann-
Whitney tests confirm this, and fail to reject the null hypotheses of no difference between the 
groups with wide margins’. After we control for industry differences, the categories seem 
even more similar as most of the test statistics are smaller. The level of long-term debt is also 
far from significant for any of the pairwise comparisons.  
Based on this we have no reason to believe that the outcome of a distressed situation depends 
on the firm’s leverage. High leverage is rather a determinant of why firms end up in distress 
in the first place, but when it has occurred, other factors play a more important role.  
5.1.4.2 Interest expenses  
Another variable that can give indications of whether a firm has unreasonably high leverage 
is how large their interest payments are. We have chosen to measure it as interest expenses 
relative to total sales from the firm’s income statement one year prior to the credit event. 
This measure will indicate how large a fraction of a firm’s annual income that is used to pay 
their ongoing financing costs. The higher this ratio is the less is the firm left with to pay 
other expenses. Based on this we expect firms with a high interest expense to sales ratio 
prior to the credit event to undergo more comprehensive restructurings or liquidate than 
those only postponing their obligations.  
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Table 5.8 - Interest Expenses and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares level of interest expenses for firms in our four categories. We measure the level 
of interest expenses as a ratio to total sales. All figures are found in the financial statements one year 
prior to the credit event. Panel A shows median and mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics 
from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
  
  Interest expense / 
Sales 0.58 (0.57) 0.59 (0.51) 0.33 (0.42) 0.68 (0.62) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
  
    Interest expense / 
Sales 0.424 1.389* 2.101** 0.405 1.529* 0.965 
 # Observations 12 vs. 7 12 vs. 28 12 vs. 16 7 vs. 28 7 vs. 16 28 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
This measure can be said to reflect both the firm’s leverage and liquidity. Large interest 
expenses are typically a result of high leverage, and the relationship is often exponential. At 
the same time will high interest expenses limit a firm’s liquidity, since these are payments 
they are obligated to meet irrespective of whether the firm is doing well or not. We should 
keep this in mind for the following analysis. 
Table 5.8 reports medians, averages and pairwise test results for all categories on this 
measure. Again the average values should not be emphasized too much, since a few extreme 
observations skew the averages upwards for all categories. Equinox Offshore 
Accommodation Ltd, being one example, pulls the average of the Capital Structure Change 
category up dramatically with its ratio of 222. Fortunately this does not pose a problem to us 
when using a Mann-Whitney test, as this test only consider the ranking of the firms based on 
the measure, not the absolute values. We should also mention that we have excluded all 
observations where figures on interest expenses were unavailable. These cases only 
disclosed net financial costs without specifying in the notes, thus making it impossible to 
extract the actual interest expenses. Most of these were liquidation cases, and combined with 
some firms not having sales our sample size for this measure is somewhat lower. However, 
we still have enough observations in all classes to perform statistical tests.  
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Based on the medians, the Postponed Obligation category seems to have substantially less 
interest expenses than the other categories. The highest median is found for Sale of asset 
firms, with a ratio of 0.4. Also the Liquidation and Capital Structure Change category have 
relatively high ratios at 0.33 and 0.24, respectively.  
At the bottom of Panel B, we find test statistics from our Mann-Whitney tests. As expected 
we find firms postponing obligations to have substantially lower interest expenses than all 
other categories. Compared to Liquidation and Sale of Assets the difference is significant at 
a 2.5 percent level, and to Change in Capital Structure at 1 percent. This indicates a very 
strong relation between interest expenses prior to the credit event and the scope of the 
restructuring. This should not come as a big surprise. If a firm has high interest expenses, 
this is likely to continue if their way of financing is not altered. As long as their sales figures 
are strong this need not be a problem, but if they experience a downturn sales are unlikely to 
bounce right back up the year after. To adapt to this, firms are often forced to find a cheaper 
way of financing. And the larger interest expenses they have, the more comprehensive must 
the restructuring be.  
From an investor point of view this conclusion could be useful when a firm first announces a 
proposal for extended maturity or postponed interest payments. If their interest expenses are 
very high compared to sales, the probability that they later must undertake a larger 
restructuring is rather high. In particular if the ratio exceeds 0.2 they should be aware, 
according to our data. Since a more extensive restructuring deteriorates more firm value they 
should consider whether they should continue as creditors or sell out. One may argue that the 
market would take this into account and adjust the price accordingly. But for this to hold we 
must assume the market to be reasonably well-functioning and informed. If this is true in 
Norway can be questioned, as particularly the high yield bond market is thin, and such 
information may not be fully incorporated in the market prices.   
The differences between the three most severe categories are far from significant on any 
levels. When a firm first has ended up with higher interest expenses than they are able to 
handle, the absolute level is not an important determinant of outcome anymore. This is a 
sensible result. Given that the firm cannon handle their financial obligations a larger 
restructuring is necessary. But whether this will happen as a debt and/or asset restructuring 
or simply by liquidation depends on other factors, like the economic viability, creditors’ 
ability to negotiate on a solution, tangibility of assets and so on.  
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To summarize, high leverage itself does not seem to explain or predict the outcome of 
financial distress. But the interest expenses paid to the debt levering the firm is one of the 
most significant determinants to whether firms end up postponing obligations or find it 
necessary with more comprehensive restructurings. We had expected to see some connection 
between the two, since the marginal cost of debt financing is known to increase 
exponentially at high debt levels. The reason why this relation is absent may be that firms in 
the Postponed obligation category have access to cheaper financing than the other firms, 
despite having just as high leverage. This can have several explanations, like more proficient 
management in debt negotiation settings. But a more likely explanation is that they are better 
firms, who the creditors are more confident will recover. Our results from analyzing 
EBITDA margins support this, as we found the firms postponing obligations to significantly 
outperform the other three categories. Since creditors have access to this information they 
are more willing to lend funds at a lower cost, because they assess the probability of 
incurring losses to be smaller.  
5.1.5 Asset liquidity 
Based on economic reasoning and previous research we hypothesized that the firms with 
high degrees of intangible assets less often would be liquidated or forced to sell assets. Our 
data show at a five percent significance level that both the Changes in capital structure and 
Postponed obligations category have relatively more intangible assets than liquidated firms. 
However, it shows no significant difference between these two and the asset restructuring 
category. The Sale of assets category as well has more intangible assets than the Liquidation 
category at a 10 percent level. 
The second determinant we use to measure asset liquidity is the relative amount of property, 
plant and equipment. This is in many aspects just the opposite part of the firm’s fixed assets, 
but there are some differences that make it worth testing as well. In addition to PP&E a 
firm’s tangible fixed assets comprise financial assets. These are often highly liquid, and 
hence easy to sell to generate cash. But they are also often not closely related to the core 
operating activities of the firm, and we would like to analyze if firms with high levels of core 
tangible assets more often are liquidated or sell assets.  
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Table 5.9 - Liquidity and Restructuring Outcome  
This table compares measures of the liquidity of assets for firms in our four categories. The 
first measures the ratio of intangible to total assets. The second measures the amount of 
property, plant and equipment relative to total assets. All figures are found in the financial 
statements one year prior to the credit event. Panel A shows median and mean values, while 
Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) Figures in % of Total assets (TA) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
Intangible / TA 0.05 (0.27) 0.04 (0.22) 0.07 (0.19) 0.00 (0.07) 
PP&E / TA 0.71 (0.51) 0.48 (0.47) 0.31 (0.40) 0.60 (0.59) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
Intangible / TA -1.454* -2.169** -1.859** 0.049 0.285 0.068 
PP&E / TA 0.141 1.196 1.878** 0.178 0.679 0.561 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
We expected to find that firms either being liquidated or going through an asset restructuring 
would have a significantly larger portion of PP&E than the others, as these are often easier to 
sell. From Panel A in Figure 5.9 we observe that the median values of these two categories 
are notably higher than for the two others. However, the only significant difference found by 
our Mann-Whitney tests was between the liquidation cases and those postponing obligations. 
The two variables tested above indicates that liquidated firms have less intangible assets, and 
compared to Postponed obligations and also more property, plant and equipment. These 
findings are on aggregate what we expected, that firms with more liquid assets would more 
often be liquidated than restructured. A priori we expected to see less intangible assets 
among asset selling firms that those undertaking debt restructurings, but the findings above 
are not unexplainable. Firms selling assets have more intangibles than liquidated firms 
probably because they are better quality firms. The intangibles express that these firms create 
value beyond the sheer value of their tangible assets, while the balance sheet of liquidated 
firms already one year prior to the credit event reflects their limited viability. The two 
categories have about the same levels of PP&E, indicating that they have just as much 
tangible assets to sell, but asset selling firms are of better quality.  
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From a creditors perspective the findings above seems rational, and might express a strategy 
they employ when investments run into distress. Intangibles are typically more worth to the 
owning firm than it would be in the market, and taking the risk to restructure the company 
for continued operations would often enhance the recovery rate. On the other hand, for the 
PP&E intense distressed cases it would be easier to recover a satisfactory amount at low risk 
by liquidating the firm.  
These findings are also interesting for equity holders investing in distressed firms; their 
equity claim is safer the more intangible assets a firm have. This is also backed by Franks 
and Torous (1989) who concludes that equity owners often receive more than fair value of 
their claim in a restructuring. Note that these equity claims could still be diluted and we have 
not analyzed returns for equity owners or any of the stakeholders for that matter.  
5.1.6 Size 
Previous studies on U.S. data have found the size of a firm to be one of the most important 
determinants for the restructuring outcome. Gilson et al. (1990) find that smaller firms are 
less likely to conduct a successful out of court restructuring. These findings suggest that 
larger firms have a comparative advantage in restructurings, and since our sample, except for 
Marine Subsea, comprise of out of court restructurings we would expect to find that smaller 
firms are more likely to be liquidated than restructured.  In the spirit of Gilson et al. (1990) 
we measure the firms’ size by the total book value of assets the year prior to the event.  
As we can see from panel A in Table 5.10 the total assets median for Sale of assets is lower 
than the rest, while Postponed obligations has the highest median, notably larger than the 
others. The means however are more in line with our expectations that the liquidated firms 
are the smallest. This is true even if we adjust for the extreme observation Frontline, which 
we have categorized as an asset sale and skews the average total assets for its category. The 
Mann-Whitney U-test however is only able to find differences between the Postponed 
obligations category and the rest on a five to ten percent significance level. Hence, our data 
suggest that larger firms are able to restructure only by postponing their obligations. 
Inspired by Brown, James and Mooradian (1991) we expected large multi-division firms to 
use asset sales frequently when restructuring. The failure of finding such relation may be 
attributed to the small number of observation particularly in the Asset sale category. 
 78 
Table 5.10 - Firm Size and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares measures of firm size for firms in our four categories. Size is measured in both 
total assets and total sales one year prior to the credit event. Panel A shows median and mean 
values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) Figures in millions NOK 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
Total assets   627 (4 760)  1 355 (2 131)  1 741 (3 194)  1 003 (1 430) 
Sales   21 (942)   85 (646)   313 (944)   25 (171) 
          
              
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
Total assets 0.519 -0.309 -1.789** -0.534 -1.359* -1.369* 
Sales 0.000 -1.440* -2.837*** -0.892 -1.925** -1.527* 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
              
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
Another way to measure the size of a firm is by total sales, as Chatterjee et al. (1996) does. 
We see from the medians in Table 5.10 that the sale of assets and liquidation categories seem 
to include the smallest firms. The averages however are also here skewed by Frontline that 
had approximately NOK 7 billion in total sales the year before restructuring. Our findings 
support the total assets results, that firms in the Postponed obligation category are generally 
larger than all the other categories. Additionally, firms restructuring by changing capital 
structure are generally larger than firms that are liquidated.  
The reasons for our result suggesting that larger firms often resolve their problems only by 
postponing payments is in line with the theory presented, but our results are in one way 
stronger. Studies on U.S. data proves larger firms were more successful restructuring in 
general, while our results indicates that larger firms tend to avoid more severe restructurings. 
There can be several potential reasons for this, based on the same arguments made for U.S. 
firms. First, larger firms often have a more diversified asset base and can sustain write-
downs and losses better. Second, they are more likely to have cash generating division or a 
division they can sell as a last resort for the creditors. Third, they often have more competent 
staff or can justify hiring consultants to help navigate through though times. Additionally we 
would like adding a fourth argument, supported by our findings. Larger firms are more likely 
to have better control over financial and operational risks and competent staff to manage it. 
 79 
Implying that if they foresee lower ability to meet obligations they quickly take action in 
order to maneuver away from a more severe restructuring. 
5.1.7 Age 
According to our logic the age of a firm could have an impact on the outcome of a 
restructuring, but no previous research has tried to find evidence for this. Our reasoning is 
based on older firms having more well-established relationships with stakeholders and a 
reputation or track record of satisfactory performance that help convince creditors to accept a 
restructuring proposal. We expect that older firms are less likely to be liquidated, and 
alternatively less likely to be forced into an asset sale.  
Table 5.11 - Age and Restructuring Outcome 
This table compares the firm age for firms in our four categories. We define age as the number of 
years between incorporation of the firm and the year of the credit event. Panel A shows median and 
mean values, while Panel B shows Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.   
          
Panel A: Median values. (Means in parentheses.) 
     
  Sale of assets 
Changes in 
capital structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
Age 10 (13) 4 (18) 4 (15) 4 (6) 
          
    
     
Panel B: Pairwise comparison Mann-Whitney U-test Z-statistic 
       
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
Age -2.097** -1.459* -0.724 0.905 0.826 0.478 
 # Observations 20 vs. 9 20 vs. 31 20 vs. 16 9 vs. 31 9 vs. 16 31 vs. 16 
 
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
 
However, as Table 5.11 shows, the median age for the asset sales category was substantially 
higher, 10 years versus 4 years for the others. The average age shows a more promising 
picture, the two financial restructuring categories are on average the oldest and it seems that 
younger firms are more likely to be liquidated. Our dataset partially proves our logic right, as 
the z-statistic from the pairwise U-test is significant for two of the tests. Younger firms are 
more often liquidated than firms forced into an asset sale or changed capital structure. This 
result could be explained by our theory that creditors are more tractable when an old firm 
experiences financial distress. 
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One interesting result is that we fail to find a difference in age between the liquidation and 
postponed obligation category. This was not as expected, and looking closer at the dataset 
we find two different groups within the postponed obligations category, ten firms younger 
than five years and the remaining six firms are older than ten years. In the Liquidation 
category on the other hand only one out of twenty is older than ten years.  
5.2 Access to bank financing 
Above we have analyzed the various determinants on samples including all firms. But as we 
observed when examining the level of bank debt, we found notable differences between the 
firms with bank debt and those without. Due to this we will analyze if firms with access to 
bank financing are different on other parameters as well, and if the relations detected above 
also hold when we exclude firms without bank financing.   
If a firm has access to bank financing or not is hard to firmly conclude. It may have no bank 
debt because it chooses to, not necessarily because it is unable to obtain it. But without any 
more reliable source available we assume that the firms with zero bank debt do not have 
access to obtain such financing.  
Table 5.12 - Medians and means for firms with and without bank debt 
This table reports median values of selected measures for firms with and without bank financing. The 
first reported figures are calculated based on firms with bank debt, while the figures for firms with 
zero bank financing are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
All 
categories 
Sale of 
assets 
Changes in 
capital 
structure 
Postponed 
obligations Liquidation 
 
 
    EBITDA/Total Assets -0.03 (-0.03) 0.01 (-0.09) -0.07 (-0.23) 0.03 (-0.03) -0.09 (-0.01) 
Trade Credit / TA 0.05 ( 0.04) 0.05 ( 0.08) 0.07 ( 0.02) 0.05 ( 0.02) 0.04 ( 0.04) 
Public / Total Debt 0.35 ( 0.79) 0.51 ( 0.79) 0.32 ( 0.82) 0.32 ( 0.76) 0.40 ( 0.79) 
Current Ratio 0.85 ( 0.94) 1.17 ( 0.13) 0.74 ( 0.94) 0.91 ( 3.77) 1.01 ( 0.71) 
Adjusted. Current Ratio -3.16 (-3.18) -2.55 (-4.07) -3.43 (-3.18) -3.16 ( 0.01) -2.57 (-2.70) 
Total Liabilities / TA 0.77 ( 0.71) 0.70 ( 0.83) 0.79 ( 0.92) 0.77 ( 0.79) 0.84 ( 0.63) 
Adjusted Debt Ratio 0.22 ( 0.23) 0.16 ( 0.32) 0.25 ( 0.41) 0.19 ( 0.40) 0.31 ( 0.20) 
Long-term Debt  / TA 0.37 ( 0.42) 0.48 ( 0.38) 0.36 ( 0.34) 0.23 ( 0.75) 0.47 ( 0.40) 
Interest expense / Sales 0.15 ( 1.11) 0.33 ( 1.23) 0.16 ( 8.97) 0.07 ( 0.01) 0.23 ( 0.67) 
Intangible / Total Assets 0.05 ( 0.00) 0.05 ( 0.37) 0.04 ( 0.21) 0.12 (0) 0.02 ( 0.00) 
PP&E / Total Assets 0.48 ( 0.58) 0.81 ( 0.40) 0.57 ( 0.34) 0.27 ( 0.63) 0.60 ( 0.66) 
Total assets 1200 (1300) 3 438 (246) 1 765 (689) 1622 (2300) 599 (1722) 
Age 5 (3) 25 (6) 4 (3) 4 (3) 7 (3) 
Number of observations 49 (27) 5 (4) 22 (9) 13 (3) 9 (11) 
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Table 5.12 compares median values for selected measures between firms with some bank 
financing and firms with no bank financing. Interestingly, there are few notable differences 
between the groups on an aggregate level. If better firms were given bank financing, they 
should on average perform better. This is true for the restructuring categories, but the 
liquidation firms with bank debt seem to perform worse. In total there is no reason to believe 
there are substantial differences. Firms without bank debt have significantly more public 
debt, but this is an obvious implication of the fact that without access to bank financing they 
must go public to get financed.  
An interesting observation is that firms with bank debt have substantially lower interest 
expenses relative to sales than firms without bank debt. Since the latter group pays a higher 
cost to obtain financing they should be riskier firms according to sound economic reasoning. 
This implies that the level of interest expenses can indicate the quality of the firm, and thus 
both if the firm will obtain bank financing and if they are able to restructure successfully. It 
also indicates that our assumption that firms without bank debt do not have access to bank 
financing is reasonable, since if they could they would rather use at least some cheaper bank 
debt.  
For the remaining variables there are no clear trends indicating that firms with access to bank 
financing differ substantially from the firms without bank debt. This is a noteworthy lesson 
by itself. When firms are in financial distress, the firms with and without bank debt are not 
significantly different other than for the obvious relation that firms with bank debt have 
more bank debt and less public financing. We should however be cautious when drawing 
any conclusions, as there are few observations within each category. With more observations 
more consistent trends may be revealed, but this is not possible here. 
Even though there are few clear differences between firms with and without bank debt, we 
also want to analyze whether the relations we found between the various determinants and 
outcome above still holds when we only look at the firms with bank debt. Table 5.13 shows 
the results from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests performed on firms with bank debt only. If 
we compare these results with corresponding tests in the preceding sections, they find the 
same relations for most of the determinants. Firms postponing obligations still have better 
performance measures than firms in the other categories, though the only significant relation 
is towards Liquidation. Liquidation cases also have less intangible assets and more fixed 
assets that particularly the Postponed obligation category. 
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Table 5.13 - Mann-Whitney U-test for firms with access to bank financing 
This table reports Z-statistics from pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests between our four categories, 
where we have excluded all firms with zero bank debt. 
  
The most notable change is that there no longer are any significant differences in the level of 
senior secured debt. Instead the Liquidation category tends to have more subordinated debt 
than the other categories, where the test toward Asset sale and Change of capital structure 
are significant at a 90 percent confidence level. This latter finding is somewhat conflicting 
with our theoretical predictions, as subordinated creditors risk losing more by liquidation and 
is expected to try avoiding this if they can. The total level of public debt however is still 
larger for liquidated firms. This could indicate that if a firm has access to bank financing, it 
is the problem to coordinate creditors that make a restructuring fail rather than the relative 
negotiation strength of various creditors and their incentives. Bank debt is typically secured 
with the highest seniority. With many subordinated creditors there are larger discrepancies in 
interests between the most dominant groups of creditors. This could increase the risk of not 
managing to align behind a solution. 
 
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
EBITDA / TA -0.600 -0.522 -1.777** 0.499 -0.105 -1.838** 
Adj. Trade credit / 
TA 0.467 -0.827 -0.924 -1.124 -1.160 -0.072 
Public  / Total Debt 0.067 0.914 1.569* 0.375 1.429* 0.785 
Senior Secured / 
Total Debt -0.214 0.571 -0.51 0.687 1.211 0.037 
Senior Unsecured / 
Total Debt -1.165 -1.48* -0.444 0.132 0.703 1.229 
Subordinated /  Total 
Debt 1.403* 1.577* 1.011 0.000 -0.561 -0.343 
Convertible Debt / 
Total Debt 0.068 1.007 1.535* 0.617 1.136 0.501 
Adjusted Debt Ratio 1.025 0.610 0.772 -0.951 -0.527 0.195 
Long-Term Debt / 
Total Assets 0.067 1.393* 1.503* 0.936 1.232 0.615 
Interest exp. / Sales 0.568 -0.561 1.545* -0.062 1.725 2.321** 
Adjusted Current 
Ratio 0.200 0.696 0.835 0.874 0.739 0.034 
Low Debt Capacity -0.510 -0.603 -0.519 0.130 0.137 -0.277 
Intangible / Total 
Assets -0.886 -1.136 -1.652** -0.312 -0.444 -0.444 
Fixed Assets / Total 
Assets -0.067 0.914 2.104** 0.437 0.838 0.956 
Total assets -1.400* -2.263** -2.771*** 0.749 0.542 -0.512 
Age -1.405* 0.312 0.336 1.051 0.940 0.541 
 
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
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Other than this most tests give the same indications. Some are no longer significant and 
some are that previously were not, but this is rather due to randomness of a small sample 
than actual differences between the sample with and without bank debt. To summarize, we 
find no particular evidence that firms with access to bank financing respond differently for 
our examined determinants than if we consider all firms. The only indication is that the 
general coordination problem among creditors now is a more important determinant of 
outcome than the relative size of different seniority groups.  
5.3 Robustness and criticism  
One obvious limitation to our analysis is the size of our sample, as we have noted several 
times. Especially with only 9 observations in the category Asset Sales the strength of our 
results are somewhat limited, and we cannot be as certain that it can be generalized to the 
population. The small sample also limits the scope of statistical tools we are able to use. As 
described in the section covering statistical methods, there are several models that would 
enable a more comprehensive description of the relative importance and magnitude of 
determinants. But since the validity of the assumptions for using these models is so 
questionable for our sample, we found the risks of using them to outweigh their benefits.  
The only additional tool we felt comfortable with besides the Mann-Whitney U-test was 
logistic regressions. These could in addition to the direction indicate the magnitude and 
relative importance of different determinants, but due to the small number of observations 
we are reluctant to emphasize and interpret the magnitude of coefficients too literally. When 
we take this stand, logit regressions do not add much more than we learn from the U-tests, 
and based on this the logit regressions should primarily be used for confirming the results 
from the U-tests. As the z-statistics of coefficients from simple logit regressions, reported in 
the Appendix, indicate do these in general convey the same trends as our corresponding U-
tests reported above. This contributes to strengthen our conclusions.  
Still, we acknowledge that interpreting results based on so few observations must be done 
with caution, and the economic differences should be emphasized more than statistical 
significance or the lack of such. But given the moderate size of the Norwegian bond market 
we must accept that the number of restructuring cases at our disposal will be limited.  
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Another limitation is the time period we have restricted ourselves to analyze. Ideally we 
should have analyzed a complete business cycle, by including more years prior to 2005. But 
since the market for high yield obligations, those typically involved in credit events, was so 
small prior to this we would not obtain many extra observations. This is confirmed by the 
fact that we have no observations from 2005. The limited available data as we move further 
back in time also reduces the feasibility of including earlier years.  
Previous research on bond restructurings in Norway is very limited, and there are few to 
none available databases with a comprehensive overview of the high yield bond market and 
firms involved in credit events. Compiling a dataset including the affected firms and 
gathering data of sufficient quality required a significant amount of time. This limited our 
scope from what would be possible with a more readily available dataset.  
We have not been able to find comparable research in Norway’s neighboring markets such 
as Sweden or Denmark. These bond markets are also perceived as more developed than the 
Norwegian (Oslo Stock Exchange, 2006), which could give us more insights on likely 
developments in the Norwegian market. Either comparing our findings with such research or 
extending our scope to include other markets would possibly add to the significance level of 
our findings. 
A possible source of bias in our sample is the firms experiencing financial problems close to 
the end of our sampling period. Since these cases are so recent we cannot be certain that the 
currently last restructuring attempt has solved their problems permanently. This could lead to 
misclassification, most obviously by categorizing a firm to have postponed obligations when 
they later must undertake a more comprehensive restructuring. But since none of our recent 
observations have been categorized as postponing obligations we do not fear this to be a big 
problem.  
Another possible bias relates to the quality of our financial accounting data, especially for 
liquidated firms. We had to exclude several liquidation cases, since they had not finished any 
financial statement before they went bankrupt. And those we kept often had less detailed 
data than we wanted. Since these financial statements typically are not as worked through, 
we cannot guarantee for the quality and precision of the data.  
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify determinants explaining restructuring 
outcomes for financially distressed firms in the Norwegian bond market. This includes both 
Norwegian firms and foreign firms issuing bonds in the Norwegian market. We have 
restricted the time period to bonds issued in the seven-year period from January 1st 2005 to 
December 31st 2011.  
We identified 81 firms involved in a distressed credit event leading either to liquidation or 
some sort of restructuring in this period. Due to very insufficient available data on a few of 
these we were forced to drop five firms from our sample. This left us with a final sample for 
analysis of 76 firms. Out of these 9 were restructured by selling assets or parts of the 
business. 31 restructured their debt contracts in a way that altered the post-restructuring 
capital structure. 16 firms managed to resolve the financial distress by postponing their 
obligations for some time, while 20 firms were forced to liquidate. We have restricted 
ourselves to look at the first successful restructuring for each firm.  
Based on historical financial accounting data for these firms, we tested the significance of 
possible determinants that could distinguish these categories. We found the category of firms 
postponing obligations to stand out in many ways. They performed significantly better prior 
to the credit event than other firms measured by EBITDA to total assets. They were also 
significantly larger measured both in total assets and sales than firms in the other categories. 
Third, we found their interest expenses to sales to be significantly lower than for other firms, 
indicating that the degree of distress is less severe for these firms.  
Creditor coordination problems have been treated extensively in previous research, but 
primarily on U.S. data. Our findings support much of this research, but somewhat 
surprisingly fail to find some relations too. Liquidated firms are financed by significantly 
more public debt than firms succeeding with a debt restructuring, and also have significantly 
more senior secured bonds. Both these findings are as expected. Public debt, with more 
dispersed owners, makes it harder to unite creditors behind a solution. Senior secured 
bondholders also have less to lose by liquidating the firm.  
Previous research has found strong negative relations between the level of trade credit and 
success of out-of-court restructuring, but we fail to find any such relation. An explanation 
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may be the lack of a well-functioning Chapter 11 framework in Norway. Since trade credits 
constitutes relatively small claims on the firm, larger creditors are better served by forgiving 
some of their own claims than liquidating or going through a public debt negotiation, since 
the latter alternatives may deteriorate more of their values. 
Asset liquidity is found to be an important determinant of outcome. Liquidated firms have 
significantly less intangible assets than firms succeeding with a debt restructuring. Since 
tangible assets are easier to convert to cash, creditors lose less by liquidating such firms. 
Asset selling firms also have more intangibles than liquidated firms, but just as much 
property, plant and equipment. This indicates that their assets are just as liquid, but that they 
are more economically viable.  
Apart from the statistically significant determinants, other interesting observations have been 
made. Virtually all firms in our sample have current ratios below industry average, but when 
a firm first has encountered financial problems, liquidity ratios cannot predict the outcome. 
The same is true for leverage, if we measure the debt level alone. Most of our firms have 
debt above industry average, but there are no significant differences between the groups.  
Among the liquidated firms significantly fewer have access to bank financing than firms in 
the debt restructuring categories. The relative amount of bank debt to total liabilities is of 
less importance. However, given that a firm has bank debt, the banks seem to be reluctant to 
forgive debt, increasing the risk of liquidation as the level of bank debt increases.  
We also analyzed if the outcome for firms with access to bank financing depend on other 
determinants that firms in general. Our findings suggest that many of the same determinants 
affect outcome regardless of bank debt access. However, when there are multiple creditor 
classes, the coordination problem seems to be more important than the relative size of the 
classes in determining outcome when bank debt is involved. 
We have not found space in our thesis to analyze differences in returns or post-restructuring 
performance. With more available time and resources we would have looked into this, as it is 
a very interesting topic. However, the limited liquidity of the Norwegian bond market with 
few reliable market price quotations, especially for high yield bonds, requires a more 
sophisticated pricing method. Another classification of firms would also be appropriate for 
this analysis.  
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With more resources there are also a number of determinants we would find it interesting to 
test, like shadow ratings by credit analysts, investment activities prior to the credit events 
and the share of domestic versus international owners of the bonds if we had access to such 
data.  
Another topic we would include with a wider scope was how bonds repaid at maturity 
without any credit events differs from our sample. It would be interesting to analyze whether 
financial data or other characteristics at time of issue can predict whether a bond will default 
or perform as intended. It would also be interesting to conduct a similar analysis as ours in 
some years’ time. Then the analysis could be based on a larger sample, we could span over a 
complete business cycle, and the bond market would probably be more mature and well-
functioning.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Results from logistic regressions  
In addition to the Mann-Whitney U-tests reported in the Findings section we ran simple 
logistic regressions on the same determinants. The models are constructed as pairwise 
comparisons using only one explanatory variable at the time. Multinomial logit regressions 
would allow including all categories in one regression, but to make the results more directly 
comparable to the Mann-Whitney tests binomial logit regressions are used. 
An example model comparing the EBITDA to sales ratio between Liquidation and Sale of 
assets can be written 𝑃(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝒙) = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖   
Here Liquidation is the target group. We are interested in the significance of the 
EIBTDA/Sales coefficient. A positive β1 would indicate that a larger EBITDA margin 
increases the probability of Liquidation and a negative β1 would indicate the opposite. As 
discussed in the section on statistical method we are reluctant to interpret the coefficient too 
literally, due to the small sample size. Since we are more interested in the trend it indicates 
rather than absolute magnitude we have only reported the corresponding z-statistic for 
significance of the coefficient below. A negative z-statistic indicates that the explanatory 
variable is negatively correlated with the target group, which is the first mentioned in each 
heading, in the pairwise comparison.  
When comparing the results to the corresponding Mann-Whitney U-tests, the logit 
regressions convey most of the same trends. Some determinants are not significant using 
logit regressions and opposite, but the general trends are more or less the same. This lends 
support to the conclusions and arguments we posed in the findings section.  
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Table 7.1 – Logistic regressions 
 
  
 
  
Liquidation 
vs. Sale of 
assets 
Liquidation 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Liquidation 
vs. 
Postpone  
Asset sales 
vs. Capital 
structure 
Asset 
sales vs. 
Postpone  
Capital 
structure vs. 
Postpone 
EBITDA / Sales (1yr) 0.96 0.80 -0.87 0.16 -0.76 -0.90 
EBITDA / TA (1yr) -0.08 1.210 -1.470* 0.870 -1.480* -2.09** 
EBITDA / Sales (2yr) 0.60 0.04 -0.79 -0.33 -0.97 -0.82 
EBITDA / TA (2yr) 0.04 0.88 -1.74** 0.64 -1.64* -2.20** 
Trade credit / TA -0.60 -0.70 0.41 0.18 0.88 1.11 
Adj. Trade credit / 
TA -0.54 -0.39 -0.27 0.39 0.42 0.12 
Bank Debt / Tot Debt 0.13 -0.56 -0,80 -0.60 -0.90 -0.36 
Bank Debt (<0) / 
Total Debt 0.67 0.71 0.68 -0.14 -0.13 0.03 
Public  / Total Debt 0.51 1.36* 1.99** 0.56 1.26 1.04 
# of public contracts 0.23 0.00 1.41* -0.17 0.66 0.90 
Senior Secured / 
Total Debt 0.49 1.89** 1.39* 0.47 0.73 -0.27 
Senior Unsecured / 
Total Debt -0.15 -0.51 1.05 -0.24 1.20 1.46* 
Subordinated /  Total 
Debt -0.08 -0.68 -0.38 -0.53 -0.19 0.29 
Convertible Debt / 
Total Debt -1.91** -1.15 0.222 1.08 1.83** 1.19 
Total Debt / TA -0.30 -0.68 0.36 -0.34 0.77 0.80 
Adjusted Debt Ratio 0.28 -0.59 0.59 -0.54 0.25 0.80 
Long-Term Debt / 
Total Assets -0.14 -0.20 0.20 -0.04 0.29 0.33 
Interest exp. / Sales 0.39 -0.47 0.77 -0.60 -0.25 -0.99 
Current Ratio 0.70 0.79 0.79 -0.76 0.36 0.82 
Adjusted Current 
Ratio 0.70 0.83 0.78 0.73 -0.43 0.65 
Low Debt Capacity -0.83 0.13 0.42 0.94 1.08 0.46 
Intangible / Total 
Assets -1.93** -1.89** -1.76** 0.49 0.71 0.30 
Fixed Assets / Total 
Assets 0.64 1.32* 1.87** 0.30 0.76 0.66 
Total assets -1.39* -1.02 -1.41* 1.41* 0.65 -1.03 
Age -2.04** -1.03 -1.30* -0.37 -0.17 0.34 
 
*  = significant at 10 %, ** = significant at 5 %,  *** = significant at 1 % 
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7.2 Potential determinants of outcome not tested 
7.2.1 Ratings 
An interesting variable to test would be the rating of firms, both at the time they issue the 
bonds involved in the restructuring and at the time of default. This could tell us whether 
ratings can predict a default in the future, or if it can predict the outcome given default. 
Barely any of our firms are rated by the major credit rating agencies. There are however 
ratings on several firms performed by various brokerage houses, and most of these are 
recorded in a database facilitated by The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management 
Association. But for many firms the ratings are seldom or never updated. There are also a 
non-negligible number of firms in our sample that never have been rated. This would make it 
impossible to consistently attribute ratings to firms either at time of issue or time of default, 
and based on such data we would not be able to perform any meaningful analysis. 
7.2.2 Share of foreign vs. Norwegian creditors 
One may hypothesize that Norwegian and foreign creditors behave differently in a 
renegotiation process, either due to fundamental cultural differences or because Norwegian 
creditors connect better with the debtor and the trustee. If this is true, the share of foreign vs. 
Norwegian creditors at time of default could be an important determinant for the outcome of 
distress. This information may be available for listed bonds through VPS 
(Verdipapirsentralen), but only about 2/3 of the bonds in our sample are listed. To attain this 
information at time of default for the non-listed firms would be too challenging given our 
restricted time and resources. With an already small sample size we could not afford 
omitting so many observations for such an analysis, even though this potential relation 
undoubtedly is among the most interesting.  
7.2.3 The number of banks involved 
In our analysis we have used the amount of bank debt relative to other sources of financing. 
But it would also be interesting to look at the number of banks involved in the firm at the 
time of default. As the number of involved banks increase, the coordination problem will 
increase in a similar way as for public debt. Being able to control for this could both clarify 
the effect of bank debt itself and say something about how large the coordination problems 
among banks are in debt negotiation processes. Unfortunately, most annual reports do not 
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disclose how many banks the firm has credit facilities at. A database of bank loans in 
Norway does exist, but since we were not guaranteed access to this database we chose not to 
pursue this further.  
7.2.4 Time to maturity 
The remaining time to maturity at default, original time to maturity and remaining relative to 
original time to maturity could be interesting determinants to test. It makes sense from an 
economical perspective that bondholders act differently in a restructuring depending on the 
remaining time to maturity. However, given our restructuring categories there are arguments 
in both directions for all our categories to have shorter or longer time to maturity at the 
restructuring date. We have not been successful in finding a way to control for these effects 
and consequently unable to construct a credible hypothesis. 
7.2.5 Time spent under restructuring 
One of the determinants used in international research is the time spent on the restructuring 
process and its effects on final outcome (Moulton et.al. 1993). The problem with testing this 
on Norwegian data is that there are only a few public restructuring cases. Most restructuring 
cases in the Norwegian market are kept quiet until the majority of the bondholders agree 
with the process and if such processes exist than the bondholders’ meetings, where the 
suggestion is put to a vote, seem as formalities.  
7.2.6 Shareholder involvement in the restructuring process 
In some cases the restructuring solution has involved participation from shareholders, though 
issuing of new shares. It could be that firms where shareholders are involved in the 
restructuring distinguish themselves from the others. But given our approach and 
categorization analyzing this is not feasible. It would require another categorization, and 
rather an analysis of the differences in characteristics between these firms and others, which 
we find to be outside the scope of this thesis.  
7.2.7 Industries 
Brekke and Haugland (2010) found that the oil and gas and oil service industries were 
slightly overrepresented among defaulting firms relative to their total outstanding amount. It 
could be that certain industries are overrepresented in some our categories in a similar 
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manner. But using it as a determinant is not a good idea. Firms in the same industry typically 
have similar characteristics, but using it as a variable could blur the effect of the underlying 
variables, like asset liquidity. These underlying variables are both more precise and 
interesting to analyze. Secondly, we do not have enough observations in most industries to 
make any statistical comparisons.  
  
 93 
7.3 Complete High Yield Sample 
Table 7.2 – High Yield Sample 
	   	   	   	   	  
High	  Yield	  Sample	  
AB Stena Metall Finans Eastern Echo Holding Plc Monitor Oil PLC Seabird Exploration PLC 
Aberdeen Bergerveien 12 AS EDB Ergogroup ASA Mosvold Drilling Ltd SeaDragon Offshore Ltd 
Aberdeen Eiendom Holding 
Norden/ Baltikum AS Eitzen Chemical ASA Mosvold Supply Plc Seadrill Ltd 
Ability Drilling ASA 
Eitzen Maritime Services 
ASA Movar IKS Seadrill Norge AS 
Aker ASA 
Electromagnetic Geoservices 
ASA MPF Corp Ltd Seametric International AS 
Aker Biomarine ASA Eltek ASA MPU Offshore Lift ASA Sevan Drilling Invest AS 
Aker Floating Production ASA 
Emerging Europe Land 
Development AS Nattopharma ASA Sevan Marine ASA 
Aker Invest II KS Enovation Resources Ltd Neptune Marine Invest AS 
Ship Finance International 
Limited 
Aladdin Oil & Gas Company ASA 
EOAL Cyprus Holdings 
Limited Nextgentel Holding ASA Sinoceanic Shipping ASA 
Altinex ASA 
Equinox Offshore 
Accomodation Limited Nexus Floating Production Ltd Sinvest AS 
Altinex Oil Norway AS Estatia Resort Property AS Njord Gas Infrastructure AS Skdp 1 Ltd Cyprus 
American Shipping Company ASA Fairstar Heavy Transport NV NOR Energy AS Software Innovation AS 
APL ASA Farstad Shipping ASA Nordic Heavy Lift ASA 
Sogndal Eigedomsselskap 
AS 
Apptix ASA  Fauske Kommune Nordic Mining ASA Solstad Offshore ASA 
Arrow Seismic ASA Fesil AS Nordic Ocean AS Solstad Rederi II AS 
AS Alsten Fastlandsforbindelse 
Finnmark Bompengeselskap 
AS Nordkapp Bompengeselskap AS 
Solør Bioenergi 
Infrastruktur AS 
AS Fastlandsfinans Fjellstrand AS Norgani Hotels AS 
Songa Floating Production 
ASA 
AS Fjellinjen Floatel Superior Ltd. Norse Energy Corp. ASA Songa Offshore SE 
Atlantic Oilfield Services Ltd FPS OCEAN AS Norske Skogindustrier ASA Spectrum ASA 
Austevoll Seafood ASA Fram Exploration ASA North Atlantic Drilling Limited Standard Drilling ASA 
Avantor AS Fred Olsen Energy ASA Northern Offshore LTD StepStone AS 
B&H Ocean Carrier Ltd. 
Frigstad Discoverer Invest 
Ltd (BVI) Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA Stolt-Nielsen Limited 
Banetele AS Front Exploration AS Norwegian Car Carriers ASA Storebælt AS 
Bassdrill Alpha Ltd Frontier Drilling AS Norwegian Energy Company ASA STX Europe AS 
Bayerngas Produksjon Norge AS Frontline Ltd Ocean Rig ASA 
Sunnhordland Bru- og 
Tunnelselskap AS 
BB Finans ASA Funcom N.V. Ocean Rig UDW Inc. Svithoid Tankers AB 
Belships ASA Gamle Holding AS Oceanlink Ltd Synnøve Finden AS 
Bergen Group ASA Geopard A/S Oceanteam Shipping ASA Sølvtrans Rederi AS 
Bergen Oilfield Services AS Glamox ASA Odfjell SE Tandberg Data ASA 
BIR AS Global Rig Company ASA  Offshore Heavy Transport AS Tandberg Storage ASA 
Blom ASA 
Golden Close Maritime Corp 
Ltd Olympic Ship AS 
Teekay Offshore Partners 
L.p. 
Bluestone Offshore Pte Ltd Golden Ocean Group Ltd Onetwocom AB (publ) Telio Holding ASA 
Bluewater Holding B.V.  Grieg Seafood ASA Oren Oil ASA Thule Drilling AS 
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Boa OCV AS Hambo Ab Oy Oslofjordtunnelen AS TMG International AB 
Bonheur ASA Havila AS Osterøy Bruselskap AS 
Tordenskjold ASA 
konkursbo 
Borgestad ASA Havila Shipping ASA PA Resources AB Transeuro Energy Corp 
BW Gas AS Heritage Oil Corp Panoro Energy ASA 
Transocean Norway 
Drilling AS 
Camo AS Hexagon Composites ASA Peterson AS 
TrollDrilling & Services 
Ltd 
Cecon ASA 
Hitra Frøya 
Fastlandssamband AS PetroBakken Energy Ltd 
Trøndelag Bomveiselskap 
AS 
Chloe Marine Corporation Ltd Host Hoteleiendom AS 
Petrobank Energy and Resources 
Ltd. TTS Group ASA 
Club Cruise Entertainment & 
Travelling Services Eu Hurtigruten ASA Petrojack ASA Umoe AS 
Codfarmers ASA I. M. Skaugen SE Petroleum Geo-Services ASA Vadsø Vann og Avløp KF 
Color Group AS IBB Byg AS Petrolia ASA Valhalla Oil and Gas AS 
COSL Drilling Europe AS Ibsenkvartalet Hjemmel AS PetroMena ASA 
Valiant Petroleum Holdings 
AS 
COSL Drilling Semi AS Ignis AS Petrominerales Ltd Vann AS 
Crew Gold Corp 
Interoil Exploration and 
Production ASA PetroProd Ltd Venture Drilling AS 
Dana Petroleum Norway AS J. Lauritzen A/S PetroRig III 
Vestfjorden Avløpsselskap 
(VEAS) 
Danmarks Radio Jason Shipping ASA Polarcus Alima AS Viken Fibernett AS 
Dannemora Mineral AB Jasper Explorer PLC Polarcus Ltd (Cayman Islands) Viking Drilling ASA 
Davie Holding AS KCA DEUTAG Offshore AS 
Primorsk International Shipping 
Ltd Villa Organic AS 
DDI Holding AS Kragerø Fjordbåtselskap AS Prosafe SE Visma AS 
Deep Drilling 1 Pte. Ltd Krillsea Group AS 
Realkapital European Opportunity 
AS Vmetro ASA 
Deep Sea Bergen Invest AS Kungsleden AB (publ.) Reitan Handel AS Volstad Maritime AS 
Deep Sea Supply AS Kverneland ASA Rem Offshore ASA Wega Mining AS 
Deepocean AS 
Larvik Kommunale Eiendom 
KF 
Remedial (Cyprus) Public 
Company Limited 
Wentworth Resources 
Limited 
Delphin Kreuzfahrten Levanger Rådhus AS Remedial Cayman Limited Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA 
Det Norske Oljeselskap ASA LK Holding I AS 
Renewable Energy Corporation 
ASA Ziebel AS 
Didon Tunisia Ltd London Mining Plc 
Reservoir Exploration Technology 
ASA Norwegian Property ASA 
DNO International ASA 
Lotos Exploration and 
Production Norge AS Ringsaker kommune Selvaag Bolig ASA 
Dockwise Ltd. Malka Oil AB Rocksource ASA Morpol ASA 
DOF ASA 
MARACC - Marine Accurate 
Well ASA Rowan Drilling Norway AS Subsea 7 Inc. 
Dof Subsea AS Marine Harvest ASA Roxar AS Umoe Bioenergy ASA 
Domstein ASA Marine Subsea AS Rubicon Offshore Holdings Wintershall Norge ASA 
DP Producer AS 
Marine Subsea Cyprus 
Holding Ltd Safetel AS Handelseiendom II AS 
DSB Master Marine AS Scan Geophysical ASA Proserv Group AS  
DSB S-Tog A/S Metallkraft AS 
Scandinavian Airlines System 
Denmark - Norway - Sw 
 
Eastern Drilling ASA 
Middle East Jackup I 
Company Sea Production Ltd 
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7.4 Exchange rates used for conversion 
This table summarizes the exchange rates used for converting annual report figures in 
foreign currencies to NOK. Panel A shows the implied exchange rates from the SNF 
database, which we was used to the extent possible to secure consistency. Panel B shows 
year-end closing rates retrieved from Yahoo! Finance. A further explanation of how the 
exchange rates are uses is found in the Data section. 
Table 7.3 – Exchange rates 
	  
Panel A: Implied exchange rates from the SNF Database 
 
 
USDNOK EURNOK CADNOK SEKNOK 
2006 - - - - 
2007 5.404  - - - 
2008 6.999  9.867  - - 
2009 5.757  - - - 
2010 5.849  - - - 
2011 - - - - 
 Panel B: Official year-end exchange rates 
 
 USDNOK EURNOK CADNOK SEKNOK 
2006 6.228 8.187 5.383 0.910 
2007 5.432 7.932 5.469 0.840 
2008 6.958 9.710 5.731 0.887 
2009 5.781 8.282 5.522 0.807 
2010 5.824 7.795 5.839 0.868 
2011 5.979 7.744 5.852 0.868 
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7.5 Filtering process 
The table describes the process of finding bond issues that have been involved in credit 
events. We start out with every bond in the Stamdata database, which is approximately 90 
percent of the bond market (Oslo Stock Exchange, 2006). The filters applied are shown in 
the column to the left and the remaining bonds are shown on the same line.   
Table 7.4 – Filtering process 
 
 
 
          
  
 
Issues Volume (mNOK) 
 Bond issues from ’93 – ‘11  16 178 6 884 384  
     
 Filter 
 
Remaining  
issues 
Remaining 
volume (mNOK) 
 Maturity after 01.01.05 and  
settlement before 31.12.11  11 615 5 541 827  
Bank  6 761 4 195 507  
Finance  5 878 3 374 885  
Utilities  4 840 3 089 185  
Public Sector  2 144 603 656  
Insurance  2 140 603 004  
Under mNOK 30  2 139 603 004  
Determined as investment  
grade by Pareto  771 291 051  
     
Added back to sample Issuers Issues Volume (mNOK) 
 Firms from Pareto  
High Yield Bond Report 12 266 786 298 219  
     
Final Sample Issuers Issues Volume (mNOK) 
 Firms involved in credit events 81 243 78 939  
Debt involved in credit events 
with sufficient data 76 145 55 391  
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